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The North Atlantic's nineteenth-century fishing industry covered a vast 
geographic and socioeconomic unit. It extended fiom the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the 
Atlantic Ocean, around the Grand Banks off Newfoundland, and south to the George's 
Banks off the coast of Massachusetts. Those who participated in the industry, both 
merchants and workers, operated within a global economy. Markets for fish products 
were not always domestic; in fact the majority of fish caught was shipped to foreign 
markets in the Mediterranean and the West Indies. The capital that was invested in the 
industry came fiom London, Halifax, Boston, and other economic centers throughout the 
world. Fishermen harvested their products fiom international waters and often found 
themselves encroaching upon protected waters of foreign nations. Therefore, this thesis 
examines the industry not fiom a regional perspective, as is the case of many prior 
histories, but fiom an international approach that recognizes the borderlands of the North 
Atlantic. Within these borderlands, fishermen and merchants carried out their business 
with the understanding that the industry did in fact exist within an international 
community. Fishermen in Nova Scotia recognized their ability to abandon their domestic 
arrangements with local merchants in favor of new relationships with American vessels, 
merchants, and capital. Meanwhile, merchants in Nova Scotia, recognizing the ability of 
the fishermen to transfer their business to American firms, sought to prevent the existence 
of close cooperation between Nova Scotia's and New England's fishing laborers in order 
to maintain their economic, political, and social control over the fishermen. This was 
perpetuated through the use of a debt-credit bond, commonly known as the truck system. 
In 181 8 the United States and Britain signed a treaty that, for the most part, 
restricted fishermen to domestic waters and merchants to home markets. By 1854 the 
economy of the North Atlantic fishery had undergone dramatic transformation. No 
longer did the merchants of Nova Scotia and their protected markets within the British 
Empire dominate this industry. New England f m s  had gradually gained control of the 
profits yielded ffom this trade through the deconstruction of mercantilism throughout the 
Empire, the expansion of the American domestic market, and the accumulation of capital 
and labor within the Northeastern of the United States. As a result, the majority of 
fishing labor in the North Atlantic transferred themselves to large New England f m s ,  
leaving those firms in Nova Scotia with a diminished labor force and eventually 
destroying their hopes of regaining control of the industry. 
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Chapter 1 
Regionalism and Borderlands: 
The Historiography of the North Atlantic Fishery 
Introduction 
In 1837 the chair of the House of the Assembly committee dedicated to the 
fisheries of Nova Scotia, James Boyle Uniacke, reported the following: 
The Youth of the Province are daily quitting the Fislung Stations and 
seeking employment on board United States Vessels, conducting them 
to the best Fishing Grounds, carrying on trade and trafic for their new 
employers with the Inhabitants, and injuring their Native Country by 
defrauding its Revenue diminishing the operative class, and leaving the 
aged and infirm to burthen the Community they have foresaken and deserted.' 
Uniacke's statement illustrates a number of important issues that have been neglected by 
historians of New England and Atlantic Canada. His report indicates that Nova Scotian 
and American fishermen were actively interacting with one another through trade, 
navigation, and employment in opposition to the desires of the merchants and politicians 
of Nova Scotia, a group that James Uniacke represents. Given such a transnational 
perspective among those participating in the North Atlantic fishery, it becomes clear that 
a history of the industry must account for the borderland dynamic of the North Atlantic. 
The North Atlantic fishing industry of the nineteenth century covered a vast 
geograpluc and socioeconomic unit. It extended from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the 
Atlantic Ocean, around the Grand Banks off Newfoundland, and south to the George's 
Banks off the coast of Massachusetts. This industry touched virtually everyone who lived 
and worked in this region. It was conducted by colonial merchants, European migratory 
' House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, JmmaI of fhe Assembly, "Report of the Committee of the Fisheries, 
April 10, 1837," by James Uniacke. Appendix 75. p. 4. 
fishermen, and American capitalists. While this industry has been the subject of 
substantial historical literature, few historians have discussed the international economic 
and political dynamics as they existed in a borderlands region. The policies adopted by 
the provincial government of Nova Scotia and the federal government of the United 
States represent the close proximity - both geographically and economically - between 
the New England and Nova Scotian fishing industries. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century the socioeconomic borderlands of the North Atlantic fishing industry 
provided the underlying themes in policy formation. 
Regional identity is a difficult aspect to establish when dealing with individuals 
who work at sea. As will be discussed below, there are many cases in which the 
fishermen of a nation defined the border in a different fashion than did their political 
leaders. For example, in more than one case the fishermen of Grand Manan Island saw 
the ships from Saint John, New Bnmswick, as foreign and those from Eastport, Maine, as 
their neighbors. Therefore, in order to understand the trends of the fishing industry, one 
must include international economic and political trends and not isolate this transnational 
industry within the confines of a current nation, province, or state. To do this the current 
research and writing of borderlands theory in North American history must be 
considered. 
Garth Stevenson defines a borderland region as "a territorial entity having some 
natural and organic unity or community of interest that is independent of political 
administrative boundaries ... a 'natural' regionalism that contrasts with their own 
artificia~ity."~ Ths  statement leads one to seek an understanding of regionalism with 
little to no reference to international border making. Similarly, American historian C. 
Vann Woodward states: "to limit the subject of historical study within national 
boundaries is always to invite the charge of narrow perspective and hstorical 
A borderland is an area in which a politically constructed border divides a 
geographic region that would have otherwise shared a communal sense of identity. This 
unity is often the result of similar geographic, social, religious, andlor economic 
structures. In studying Canadian regonalism, Garth Stevenson states that "an analysis of 
Canadian regionalism that fails to view it in its North American context is incomplete 
and seriously misleading.'* Therefore, the North Atlantic fishing industries of British 
North America and New England cannot be properly examined without an understanding 
of the borderlands aspect of this specific regon. An industry that was so heavily 
dominated by international trends requires the incorporation of the borderland philosophy 
that has been developed by geographers such as Victor Konrad, who argued, 
The borderlands of the United States and Canada are distinctive regions 
of mitigating landscape fading from the common edge of the boundary. 
Borderlands evolve from border regions, or contiguous zones in which 
exchange between nation-states take place. Between Canada and the United 
States, borderlands regions have emerged, more or less, among peoples with 
common characteristics, in spite of political boundary delineated between them. 
In an extreme sense, borderlands exist when shared characteristics set a region 
apart from the countries that contain it, and residents share more with each other 
than with members of their respective national cultures. In the Canada-United 
2 Garth Stevenson, "Canadian Regionalism in Continental Perspective," Journal of Canadian Studies 15 No. 
2 (Summer 1980): 17. 
3 C. Vann Woodward, 7he Comparative Approach to American Histoty (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 
3. 
4 Stevenson, "Canadian Regionalism in Continental Perspective," p. 18. 
States context particularly, borderlands are regions that have a tempering effect 
on the central tendencies of each society, and these regions reveal the ways in 
which the nation-states blend into each other.5 
This thesis will show how the fishing communities of the North Atlantic, in both 
capital and labor migration strategies, transcended political boundaries in order to 
achleve what they believed would be economic and social security. The New England 
and Nova Scotian fishing classes often shared more with one another than they did with 
their respective national or colonial centers, and therefore they often saw each other as 
closer allies than did their own political leaders. Thus, the North Atlantic fishing 
industry constituted a border region in which labor and capital moved as freely from 
nation to nation as from town to town. The contemporary state of the North Atlantic 
fisheries would not suggest such a trend would be possible. Environmental depletion and 
the formation of a second independent nation in North America during the second half of 
the nineteenth century may very well have changed these borderlands philosophies. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, however, Massachusetts-based firms 
solidified their control over the North Atlantic fishing trade. Few of the histories of the 
fisheries incorporate an understanding of how the borderland themes shaped that 
industry. 
Since the publication of Harold Innis's monumental work on the staple theory in 
1940, most histories of Atlantic Canada have carefully considered the North Atlantic 
fi~heries.~ However, even the works that focus on this industry normally do so from a 
Victor Konrad, Borderlandr: Eksays in Canadian-American Relalions (Toronto: ECW Press, 1991), p. 
viii. 
Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History ofAn In/erna/ionol Economy (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1940) 
regional perspective that often neglects the inter-regional connections of both the 
managerial and the labor classes. This thesis will explore the investment strategies of 
Massachusetts firms and the labor patterns of Nova Scotian and New B m w i c k  
fishermen in order to demonstrate that a borderlands industry existed in the North 
Atlantic prior to the signing of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854; a treaty that has often 
been considered the first North American free trade agreement. 
Although the fishing industry of the North Atlantic existed within an international 
framework, most histories of this industry approach the subject from a regional 
perspective. Understanding the reasons and methods for these regional approaches is the 
first step to expanding the study to include the borderlands theory. The first part of this 
thesis will explore the theories advanced by historians such as Harold Innis, Rosemary 
Ommer, Daniel Vickers, Sean Cadigan, and other maritime scholars. Building upon 
these theories in order to include the global perspective of the industry, the thesis then 
asseses the government policies and investment strategies used by the various nations and 
colonies involved in the fishery. By reviewing these policies it becomes clear that those 
who shaped the industry were aware of its international dimension and sought to address 
this trend in a variety of ways to improve their own status in the global economy. Similar 
to those in economic and political power, the working force also regarded the industry as 
a global economy and sought to improve their lives by moving about the borderlands 
community. The review of these trends clearly illustrates that the fishing industry of the 
North Atlantic existed in a borderlands community, and in order to properly understand 
its influence the history of this industry should not be limited to a strictly regional 
perspective. 
5 
Regionalism and Borderlands 
The histories that discuss the North Atlantic fisheries fall into two broadly 
defined schools of thought. One focuses on the international economy, while another 
discusses localized socio-economic developments. The work by Harold Innis, The Cod 
Fisheries: The History of An International Economy, assessed the industry from a purely 
economic standpoint. His work and data focused on the global connections that were 
developed by merchants and politicians. Social historians of later generations sought to 
incorporate the people involved in the industry into Innis's staples theory. Rosemary 
Ommer and Sean Cadigan thoroughly discussed the relationship between labor and 
capital in the fisheries of Gaspe and Newfoundland, while Daniel Vickers and Wayne 
O'kary examined the changing nature of work in the fisheries based in Massachusetts 
and Maine. While all of these studies are compelling examples of regional histories, they 
include few references to the international connections among the working classes. 
Innis's work concentrates on staple production, in which an undeveloped colony 
exports raw material to more highly industrialized centers.' Therefore, imperial 
connections play a key role in the development, or underdevelopment, of this industry. 
For this reason the issues revolving around tariffs, bounties, embargoes, and exclusion 
are the primary focus of Innis's work. While these issues did affect the nature of work in 
the industry, Innis's research does not directly deal with the fishermen. Instead they are 
subordinated to imperial and national diplomats. 
7 Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries: me History ofAn IntemaiionaIEconomy (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1 M O ) ,  p. ix. 
At first it appears that Lnnis aspires to create a history in which the workers are 
included. For example, he states in his introduction: "No other industry has engaged the 
activities of any people in North America over such a long period of time and in such 
restricted areasm8 One could assume, therefore, that the people in these restricted areas 
would play an important role in communal life and local economy. Numbers, graphs, 
and charts, however, dominate Innis's work. Seldom are names mentioned, and when 
they are included they belong to elite political or economic leaders. In short, there are no 
working people in his study. 
Innis created an image of colonial unity opposed to imperial policies of free trade 
and the encroachment of American capital and ships. Innis stated that nationalism and 
British free trade went hand in hand. "The growth of nationalism in the colonies was the 
inevitable accompaniment of the British policy of free trade," he argued, especially as it 
pertained to the North Atlantic f i~heries.~ The nationalistic conclusions that Lnnis found 
could only be derived if one limits his or her interpretation to elite perspective. Contrary 
to this idea, this thesis will show the emigration of sea labor and the support of American 
smugglers by the inhabitants of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. 
This thesis questions the solidarity among British subjects in North America that Innis 
presented. 
Imperial ties between the home market and the distant producer are central to 
Rosemary Ommer. Her major synthesis, From Outpost to Outpost: A Structural Analysis 
ofthe Jersey-Gaspe' Cod Fishery, 1767-1886, relied on the understanding of a colonial 
Innis, 7he Cod Fisheries, p. 2. 
9 Innis, The Cod Fisheries, p. 489 
staple product and its production and distribution in an Atlantic economy. Ommer 
believed that a complete study of a complex staple economy can only be understood 
through the use of a case study method. By narrowing the geographic field, she 
addressed the four major issues of colonial economic history - the empire, the colony, the 
community, and the commodity - more successfully than did Innis. For Omrner, the 
focus is not on the entire North Atlantic fishery, as was the case with Innis, but upon a 
distinct segment of it, the Jersey-Gas* link, particularly the firm of Charles Robbins 
and company." 
By using this tactic, Ommer delved deeply into capital relationships in an attempt 
to explore the current and historical underdevelopment of the region. At the end of her 
major work, Ommer suggested that this underdevelopment was not necessarily the result 
of the depletive nature of the staple, but "was in large part a consequence of the manner 
in which metropolitan merchants operated a colonial staple trade using strategies which 
secured their business but, in the process, warped regional de~eloprnent."~ Thls concept 
of merchant tactics has since become a major source of controversy in both the history, 
and current management, of the North Atlantic fisheries. 
Ommer closely examined debit-credit relationships between merchants and 
fishing families.12 The system of truck credit dependence has become a central theme in 
the history of the North Atlantic fisheries. The producers of a commodity in this system, 
in this case the fishermen, purchased the equipment that they required for the season on 
10 Rosemary E. Ommer, From Outpost to Outpost: A Structural Anabsis of the Jersey-Gap& Cod Fishery, 
1767-1886 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), p. 4. 
I'  Ornmer, From Outpost to Outpost, p. 199. 
l2 Rosemary Ommer, "The Truck System in Gas*, 1822-77,'' Acadiensis 19 (Fall 1988): 91 -1 15. 
credit from the same merchant year after year. At the end of the season the producers 
returned with the raw goods, in this case the codfish, and exchanged them for a reduction 
in their credit balance. Such a system developed in communities where labor and capital 
were in short supply whle natural resources were relatively abundant. Since the product 
that has been produced by the end of'the season did not often equal the amount owed, 
this system is often interpreted as a means of labor control because it tied the producers 
to one merchant by means of indebtedness. In these social relationships, the merchants 
were able to maintain social and economic dominance through the control of capital and 
trade of comrnoditie~.'~ 
The lack of economic diversity in Gas@ prevented the fishing families from 
exploring options other than their debt-credit relationship with the local merchants. This 
notion of underdevelopment and class paternalism continues to be debated by historians. 
The question that seems to be paramount is to what extent is the underdevelopment of 
Atlantic Canada the result of shrewd business tactics and economic control by the 
merchants or the result of environmental limitations that led to a single staple economy? 
Ornrner argued that the Charles Robbins Company operated a debit-led truck system to 
maintain control. In addition, this truck system resulted in a non-diversified region that 
"undoubtedly contributed significantly to the economic retardation and 
underdevelopment of the region."14 
l3 George W. Hilton, The TnrcR System including a History of the British T d  Acts, 1465-1960 
(Westport, CT: W .  Heffer, 1960), pp. 6-8, 119-42. See also John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The 
Economy of British America, 1607-1 789 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985). 
l4 Omrner, "The Truck System in Gaspe, 1822-77," pp. 101, 115. 
In a later article Ommer examined the environmental causes that led to the 
development of the truck system. She addressed the "mythology" that has been 
developed surrounding the use of the truck system by the merchant class. Instead of 
seeing these merchants as individualistic capitalists who sought to destroy other means of 
operations to maintain their control of the labor force, Omrner suggested that we might 
understand their tactics in the context of their own time. In a society that was 
economically deprived by nature with limited natural sources of wealth and therefore 
limited amounts of currency, a system of credit-debt economy was necessary. As Ommer 
argued, the "truck system seems to have been in part a technique adopted by small 
business with restricted access to liquid capital which allowed them to continue in 
business or even expand production without the restraint that capital scarcity might 
otherwise have imposed upon them, particularly during times of deflation, depression, or 
shortage of ~oinage."'~ Although Ommer examined the economic relationship from the 
perspective of the merchants, her conclusion states that the truck system that was 
supported by the merchant elite prevented economic diversification, limited the 
fishermen's independence, and eventually led to regional underde~elo~ment.'~ 
A former student of Ommer's and resident of Newfoundland, Sean Cadigan, 
argued that the natural environment - and not the paternalistic control of the merchant 
class - led to underdevelopment. Cadigan maintained that "if people depended on 
merchants and the fishery, it was because there was little else they could do for 
I5 Rosemary Omrner, Merchant Credit andLabour Strategies in Historical Perspective (Fredericton, NB: 
Acadiensis Press, 1990), p. 50. 
16 Rosemary Ommer, "One Hundred Years of Fishery Crisis in Newfoundland," Acadiensis 23 (2) (Spring 
1994): 5-20. 
themsel~es."'~ According to Cadigan, the picture of class dependency presented by 
Ommer is the result of relying too heavily upon staple theories of production. Cadigan's 
work is one of class struggle that incorporates the natural limitations of the environment. 
In his history, Cadigan presented a community that included a variety of working 
relationships. By incorporating women, servants, and household economies into the 
story, Cadigan has shown that, although the fishery families' economy was centered on 
the merchant credit system, it was not the exclusive means of production. In addition, 
this merchant credit system provided badly needed products and economic stability in a 
single-staple economy. Although Cadigan's method can better illustrate the relationship 
between the classes of the colony, his domestic perspective ultimately fails to include 
international trends of production that influenced the staple trade. 
Cadigan attacked the "chimera fable" that had been produced by nineteenth- 
century liberal reformers and twentieth-century historians. He maintained that the theory 
of intentional underdevelopment and the manipulation of the law in favor of merchant 
interest is simply "~ntrue."'~ Cadigan argued that liberal reformers were able to use the 
economic depression of Newfoundland to incite hostility towards the merchants, and thus 
blame them and their truck system for the continual underdevelopment of the region. 
This popular opinion was used as a strong political force to undermine merchant and 
imperial control of the island that would eventually lead to the formation of responsible 
government in Newfoundland. The success of this campaign resulted in the continual 
l7 Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundlmtd, 
1785-1855 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p. viii. 
lB Cadigan, Hope andDeception in Conception Bay, pp. viii, 162. 
11 
effort by various governments to diversie the economic base of Newfoundland instead of 
trying to improve and protect their sole source of real wealth, the fisheries. Such 
political policy ignored Newfoundland's natural disadvantages for diversification. By 
ignoring the issues surrounding the fisheries, the self-proclaimed reformers opened the 
area to exploitation and eventual depletion. According to Cadigan, this is the true cause 
of Newfoundland's underdevelopment, not the truck system's supposed prevention of 
diversification. l9 
Cadigan thus rejected Omrner's assertion that the merchant class was responsible 
for the underdevelopment of the region, and the "ahistoricity of expecting that the 
merchants should have developed the fishery philanthropically, for the benefits of 
Newfoundland rather than themse~ves."~~ Such diversification was impossible on an 
island of rock. As Cadigan argued: 
Newfoundland merchants may well have been beasts, but they were no 
special ones. Their relations with the fishery families unfolded in an 
environment with particularly limited resources, which did little to 
encourage local interest in the political and legal infrastructure of a 
regon and a fishing industry often marked by antagonistic capitalist, 
colonial, and imperial interests. Merchants did not take any special 
steps to economic differentiation, because local commodity producers 
could find no resource base from which to begin such activity 
Not surprisingly, Cadigan has continued to emphasis environmental factors that 
decisively shaped the economic and social development of Atlantic Canada. 
l9 Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bqv, pp. 166- 170. 
20 Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay, p. viii. 
*' Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay, p. x .  
His most recent article, "The Moral Economy of the Commons" could very easily 
be considered environmental history.22 In tlus study, Cadigan attacked the notion of the 
"tragedy of commons" within the marine resources of the North ~ t l a n t i c . ~ ~  This theory 
states that any property - land or water - that is left to public ownership will indefinitely 
be destroyed because no one community or individual claims responsibility for the 
protection of the resource. Cadigan interpreted the local protest to the introduction of 
capital intensive technology as a unifier between the merchant and fishing classes: 
All the protests represented attempts to regulate access to marine resources 
to forestall their depletion by fbrther capitalization of the fishery. For these 
fishers, the desire to preserve a customary and equitable right to access to fish 
for all implied a need to conserve that marine resource for future generations. 
The preservation of equitable access may be seen as an ecological norm of a 
moral economy that ran counter to the individualistic and accumulative value 
of a nascent local capitalist political economy.24 
According to Cadigan, the merchants who have been attacked for the destructive 
use of the truck system actually encouraged the limitation of resources and discouraged 
the introduction of new technologies and industrial capital-based exploitation. The 
popular regulation of marine resources presents the image that the fishermen were in 
favor of a limitative use of the resources, and thus a continual preference for the truck 
system, rather than the "subordination of nature associated with capita~ism."~~ Such 
statements bring into light a wider range of issues that pertain to the North Atlantic in the 
" Sean Cadigan, "The Mord Economy of the Commons," Labour 43 (Spring 1999): 9-42. 
Garrett Harden was the first to introduce the notion of the tragedy of the commons. For hrther 
information, see Bonnie McCay, "The Culture of the Commons: Historical Observations in Old World and 
New World Fisheries" in Bonnie McVay and Hames Acheson, eds., The Question of the Commons.- The 
Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987). 
24 Cadigan, "The Moral Economy of the Commons," pp. 11-12. 
25 Cadigan, "The Moral Economy of the Commons," p. 10. 
form of economic relationships between man and nature. 
Both Ornmer and Cadigan discussed the system of truck within the confines of 
limited natural resources. Both provide compelling interpretations of this system as it 
pertains to their regions of underdevelopment and natural limitations. As Cadigan 
convincingly points out, the environment of Newfoundland prevented diversification in 
economic development and thus a continual use of the truck system. Likewise, Ommer 
refers to the truck system as a means of labor control and the concentration of capital into 
the hands of a few elites that dominated the region's economic transitions. A very 
different assessment arises when one examines and incorporates the richer resources and 
more diversified economies of New England. 
Daniel Vickers extended the discussion of the truck system to New England. For 
Vickers, the logic of the truck system is based upon 
an economic response to the difficulties of organizing production on the 
periphery of the European world-system. It did not alter the imbalance of 
power between capitalist and producer, but it did shift the agency through 
which much of that power was exercised away from the impersonal market 
that had worked in the Old World and towards the truck system and personal 
fiat that made sense in the ~ e w . ~ ~  
The truck system depended on a society that maintained a peripheral status, that 
continually exported a staple product to more industrialized regions, and depended upon 
these industrial regions for both capital and a marketplace. In his study of 
Massachusetts, Vickers demonstrated how this colony ceased to be a peripheral society 
by developing a large domestic residency and advancing other means of economic 
26 Daniel Vickers, "Merchant and Labour Strategies in the Cod Fisheries of Colonial Massachusetts" in 
Rosemary Ommer, ed., Merchanl Credil and Labour Stralegies in Hislorical Perspective (Fredericton, NB: 
Acadiensis Press, 1990), p. 43. 
survival. In this more advanced society, Vickers stated, there was no need for a system 
indebtness and the society could thus develop a wage-based economy of free enterprise." 
Vickers continued the exploration of labor systems in his book, Farmers and 
Fishermen, wherein he "investigates the process by which farmers and fishmg merchants 
constructed labor systems adequate to their needs."28 Vickers examined the use of 
capital in societies as they developed. Ln a peripheral society the general consensus was 
to invest the limited capital into the control of the labor supply and not in the 
development of additional resources. As the society matured, however, it underwent a 
transition to commercial and industrial capitalism: 
[OJn this frontier. . .the lure of unexplored resources caused economic 
growth to proceed at first along extensive lines, with rapid settlement 
but little interest in hrther improvement. What is striking about New England 
and the American northeast generally, however, is that the classic colonial 
pattern was outgrown. First in the maritime economy and later in the country- 
side, regional markets in capital and labor surfaced and the older extensive 
brand of growth gave way to more intensive development involving real gains 
in productivity and paving the way to industriali~ation.'~ 
By comparing Vickers's analysis of Massachusetts, Cadigan's research on 
Newfoundland, and Ommer's study of Gaspi, one may come to the conclusion that the 
continual use of the truck system in Newfoundland and Gasp6 was based on their status 
as peripheral colonies. The abandonment of the system in Massachusetts was the result 
of economic growth and diversification. This thesis will demonstrate how laborers and 
managers in Nova Scotia's truck system reacted to the introduction of capital from the 
foreign investors in Massachusetts. In a maritime industry, such as the fisheries, it 
Vickers, "Merchant and Labour Strategies in the Cod Fisheries of Colonial Massachusetts," p. 47. 
Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in h e x  County, Massachuseiis. 1630- 
1850 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 4-6. 
29 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, p. 9. 
becomes increasingly important to recognize international factors. 
Maritime history has become an increasingly popular field of research. The 
extent of this field is far too broad to discuss here. Nonetheless, the social histories of 
maritime topics can provide some theoretical and methodological foundations to 
understand how workers and managers interacted in an international business. Maritime 
history has persistently carried a romantic image of seafaring life that only recently has 
been challenged. The classic history of maritime life characterized that society as 
separate from the rest of the world and thus unaffected by transitions in economic forces 
and class movements. Maritime culture, according to these historians, instead held onto 
traditional notions of elitism and hierarchical supervi~ion.~~ 
These notions have come under the scrutiny of social historians who argue that 
the maritime world went through processes of industrialization and class division, similar 
to and in advance of their land-based ~ounter~ar ts .~ '  Marcus Rediker, for example, 
stated that "the romantic image of seafaring has distorted the reality of life at sea by 
concentrating on the struggle of man and nature to the exclusion of other aspects of 
maritime life, notably the jamng confrontation of man against man."32 For Rediker, the 
key to understanding the maritime world lies in the mobility of the seamen and their 
confrontation with those in command: 
The seamen's dilemma went beyond the menacing, seemingly boundless forces 
'O Samuel Eliot Morison, m e  Maritime History of M~ssachusetts B q ,  1783-1860 (Boston: Houghton 
M i a n  Company, 1921), p. 16. 
" David Alexander, "Literacy among Canadian and Foreign Seamen," in Rosemary Ornmer and Gerald 
Panting eds., Working Men Who Got Wet (St. John's, Newfoundland: Maritime History Group, 1980), p. 
32. 
Marcus Rediier, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo- 
American M&time World. 1700-1750 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 4. 
of nature he confronted. The tar was caught between the devil and the deep 
blue sea: on the one side stood his captain, who was backed by the merchant 
and royal officials and who held near-dictatorial powers that served a capitalist 
system rapidly covering the globe; on the other side stood the relentlessly 
dangerous natural world. Many important ideas and practices emerged in 
the social zone between man-made and natural dangers that governed the 
seamen's life.33 
Similarly, Eric Sager provided an analysis of the merchant marine of Atlantic 
Canada. However, he differed slightly from Rediker's claims of strict social authority. 
Instead of seeing the fleet as an undemocratic traditional society, Sager suggested that 
"the structure of authority in a ship was part of the social relations of production in an 
industry. These relationships were social artifacts created by man and not by ship." 
Moreover, as social artifacts these relationships were affected by fluctuations in larger 
social issues. As Sager pointed out, "in the nineteenth century the process of production 
at sea was changing as never before. The sailor was part of the transition to industrial 
capitalism, as capital transformed work and production on land and at sea."34 
The issues of mobility and international connections are important to the study of 
any maritime trade. Here there have been some recent disagreements. Both Rediker and 
Sager argued that the extreme mobility of the seafaring workers enabled them not only to 
see a variety of political, economic, and social relationships, but also to bring back new 
ideologies to their home base. Thus they often served as the communicators of a 
"plebeian" cultu~-e.3s Many maritime historians, both public and academic, have wme to 
the conclusion that "the mariner was a man of the world, who had more in common with 
33 Rediker, Behveen the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, p. 5 .  
34 Eric Sager, Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Athntic Canada, 1820- 1914 (Montreal: McGill- 
Queen's University Press, 1989), pp. 7- 10. 
35 Rediker, Behveen the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, pp. 294-298. 
his fellow seafarers fiom other nations than with many of his fellow 
The lack of a national affiliation to any one country among mariners that Sager 
and others have promoted has been recently criticized by Daniel Vickers. Vickers argued 
that seaman had a close connection to their homeport. They were often recruited in their 
own neighborhood with and by their childhood friends. Many masters married and had a 
home and family to return to after the voyage. Even in retirement, most mariners 
returned to their homeport and took up residency and a small plot of land for subsistence 
agriculture. For these reasons, Vickers stated, "throughout their seafaring careers most 
retained important social ties to the town of their birth."37 
Although Vickers claimed to include fishermen in this analysis, his data does not 
suggest that similar trends existed in the deep-sea fisheries.38 Some maritime historians 
have claimed that fishermen and merchant mariners were in the same class.39 But none 
has provided sufficient data to support such claims. The yearly cycles of the fisheries 
and the merchant trade would not make it very easy for a sailor to participate in both 
industries. Although a tremendous amount of evidence regarding the social makeup of 
the mariners is available, little can be found for the fi~hermen.~' This information on the 
merchant marine cannot be easily transferred to the deepsea fishermen. They made up 
36 Sager, Seafming Labour, p. 1 1. 
37 Daniel Vickers and Vince Walsh, "Young men and the sea: The sociology of seafaring in eighteenth 
century Salem, Massachusetts." Social History 24 No. 1 (Jan. 1999): 19-22. 
38 Daniel Vickers, "Salem and Massachusetts' North Shore, 1645-1760." Unpublished manuscript presented 
at the University of Maine, Fall 2000. 
39 Judith Figard, Jack in Port: Sailortowns of Eastern Can& (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1982). 
The customs offices required merchant ships to record the names, age, height, weight, nationality, origins 
of birth, and race for all mariners heading to foreign ports. Since fishermen did not land at any foreign ports 
(legally), such requirements did not exist. The most that can be drawn fiom custom records and merchant 
ledgers regarding the fishermen is often just their initials. 
two distinct sectors in society and would have developed different interpretations of class 
relations and national affiliation. Before any further research on the deep-sea fisheries 
can be conducted, maritime historians must recognize that the men who labored in this 
industry were not always in collaboration with the mariners of the merchant fleet. 
This thesis explores the interaction between American and Nova Scotian 
fishermen in the North Atlantic fishing industry between 18 1 8 and 1854. These dates 
were chosen because they reflect international treaties. The Convention of 18 18 intended 
to prevent American fishing interests from invading the domestic waters of Nova Scotia, 
thereby separating the two industries into isolated regions of production. One of the 
many clauses of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, on the other hand, opened these 
domestic waters to the American fleet in exchange for access to American market for 
Nova Scotia's fish products. The latter of these treaties has often been considered by 
historians to be the first free trade agreement in North America. For this reason many 
historians have viewed the opening of the region's waters and domestic markets as a 
tremendous achievement of politicians and diplomats.41 This thesis will argue that the 
establishment of an official free trade policy within North America had more to do with 
the fishing industry itself, most importantly its laborers, than it did with diplomats who 
41 Harry Cranbrook Allen, Great Brihin and the United States, A Histwy of Anglo-American Relations, 
1783-1952 (NY: St. Martin Press, 1955); R.E. Ankli, "Canadian-American Reciprocity: A Comment" 
Journal of Economic History 28 (June 1970): 274-81; R.E. Ankli, "The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854" 
C d a n  Jouml  of Economic Histoty 4 (1971): 1-20; John B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The 
Interplay of Canada. The United States, and Great Brihin (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1964); Irene Hecht, 
"Isreal D. Andrews and the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854: A Reappraisal" C a d a n  Historical Review 44 
(Dec. 1963): pp. 3 13-26; D.C. Masters, Reciprocity, 1846-1911 (Canadian Historical Association, Booklet 
#12, 1961); L. Officer & L. Smith, "The Canadian American Reciprocity Treaty of 1855 to 1868" J m m f  
of Economic History 28 (1968): 598-623; S.A. Saunders, "The Maritime Provinces and the Reciprocity 
Treaty" Dalhousie Review 14 (Oct. 1934); Vernon G. Setser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the 
United States, 1774-1829 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1937). 
appeared on the scene prior to the signing of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. 
This study will clarify links between the laborers and both the large-scale 
economic trends and the political agendas of the United States, Nova Scotia, and the 
British Empire. The primary focus, therefore, is not on one particular group within a 
society but on the interaction between multiple groups within an economic 
superstructure. In the North Atlantic fishing industry this included multiple nations and 
empires and therefore cannot be fully examined on a local or even regional scale. The 
sources used to examine this interaction are principally political. They include the 
debates in the United States Congress and the Assembly of Nova Scotia, published 
reports by government oficials, scientific and social studies of fishing communities 
authorized by the governments, petitions and reports submitted by merchants, merchant 
record books and journals, legal cases, and intergovernmental addresses. Instead of 
concentrating on the frustrations voiced by Nova Scotia's political and economic leaders 
towards the actions of their workers as a foundation of nationalism among the elite class, 
this thesis argues that the actions of the working class, the very activity that frustrated the 
merchants, was a form of economic independence. Workers thus held their own view of 
internationalism in the nineteenth century apart from political and merchant elites. 
Between 18 18 and 1854 the merchants and politicians of Nova Scotia 
aggressively sought the protection of their domestic waters and their local labor force 
from American influence. Their attempts ultimately failed because of changes in the 
global marketplace and the aggressive investment strategies of firms based in 
Massachusetts. By the late 1820s the British Empire had developed a free market 
environment that opened their markets in the West Indies to American fleets, thereby 
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threatening Nova Scotia's last protected markets. Shifts in industrial development, 
population growth, and urbanization gave the Massachusetts fleet a healthy market, 
which in turn encouraged further investment. 
The growing wealth of Northeast industries in the first half of the nineteenth 
century initiated the industrialization of the fishing fleet and the development of a 
payment method that reduced the overall indebtedness of the fishermen. In contrast to 
this, Nova Scotia's industry lagged and their laborers remained indebted and tied to local 
merchants. The expansionist policies of the Massachusetts firms pushed the American 
fleet into Nova Scotia's waters, thereby encouraging a closer interaction between 
American and Nova Scotian fishermen. This interaction threatened the bond between 
Nova Scotia's fishermen and merchants. In time, the fishermen would abandon their ties 
to local merchants and seek new relations with the American fleet, first in the form of 
illicit trade and eventually in the direct out-migration of a significant portion of Nova 
Scotia's labor force. 
* 
By the late nineteenth century, Nova Scotia's merchant interests were crippled by 
the more powerful industrial capitalists of southern New England. Through shifts in 
global markets, the infusion of government aid, and aggressive investment strategies, 
Massachusetts-based fishing merchants came not only to control the waters in and around 
the Atlantic provinces, but also the domestic labor force of that region. This transition 
allowed Massachusetts to dominate the North Atlantic fishing industry. 
Chapter 2 
National Policies in the North Atlantic Fishery: 
Mercantilism and Industrial Capitalism 
Throughout its history the North Atlantic fishery was part of a much larger 
international economic sphere. It attracted capital from a host of nations, particularly 
from Britain, France, and the United States. It employed citizens and immigrants from 
Ireland, Scotland, Norway, Denmark, France, Britain, British North America, and the 
United States. Its product could be found in the markets of most European nations, 
throughout the Mediterranean, in the ports of the West Indies, and along the eastern 
coastline of the United States. Since a significant part of this staple product was 
harvested in an international region - the Grand Banks - the industry was greatly affected 
by international transitions in economy, politics, and society. Both the merchants and 
laborers were well aware of this fact and continued to monitor the shifts in international 
marketplaces. Following the Napoleonic wars, the British Empire began to experiment 
with the philosophies of free trade and gradually opened several of its ports in the West 
Indies, by far the largest market for Nova Scotia's fish merchants, to American-based 
fishing firms. Meanwhile, rapid population growth and the beginnings of an industrial 
age in the United States created an even larger market for fish and fish products for a 
growing urban working force in that country. By the 1830s and 1840s the international 
advantages in the fishing industries favored the firms in the United States over those in 
British North America. 
Historians have typically considered the shift to responsible government in British 
North American and the dismantling of the British imperial mercantile system as two 
interrelated issues that played a central role in the transition in colonial government.' In 
his review of the historiography on the British Commonwealth, historian Phillip Buckner 
stated that historians have equated free trade with responsible government: 
The mercantilist system, which dictated that the metropolitan authority 
must retain a tight control over the executive branch of the government 
in the colonies in order to ensure that the Imperial commercial regulations 
were enforced, was dismantled after the victory of the free traders in Britain. 
This removed the only important barrier which might have prevented the 
Whigs, who returned to power in July 1846, from allowing the Assemblies in 
British North America to establish control of the local executive through the 
device of responsible government. Thus in rapid succession both the economic 
and political foundations of the old Imperial system were replaced by structures 
more appropriate for the future commonwealth of self-serving  nation^.^ 
Buckner claimed that this relationship between free trade and responsible government 
was derived from the historians' attempt to foreshadow the development of the British 
commonwealth system, and that contemporary policy makers seldom viewed the two 
issues as intertwined Buckner argued that: 
The pressure for free trade came from w i t h  Britain and met with little 
enthusiasm in the colonies. The pressure for responsible government came 
from within the colonies and met with little enthusiasm in London. Either 
could have developed without the other. Most free traders in Britain were by 
no means opposed to restricting colonial trade in interest of the mother country 
and most proponents of responsible government in the colonies wished to 
preserve the Imperial preferential system.3 
Although free trade and responsible government compose two separate issues, they 
nonetheless called into question the role that locally elected colonial representatives 
I Responsible government was a form of  home rule which allowed the colony to control internal government 
activities such as taxation, education, health, transportation improvements and elections. At the same time, 
the imperial authorities maintained control over international and trans-colonial legislation and agreements 
such as the Reciprocity Treaty o f  1854. 
Phillip Buckner, m e  Transifion to Responsible Government: British Policy in British North America, 
1815-1850 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 291. 
3 Buckner, i%e Transition to Responsible Government, p. 293. 
played in the formation of inter-imperial trade, a paramount topic when considering the 
colonial fishing industry. The policy makers in Nova Scotia were at once calling for 
more localized control of their internal affairs and the depression of imperial influence in 
the local government, and calling for the continuation of an aggressively protective 
commercial system between the British colonies. 
Neither the road to responsible govement nor the development of free trade 
within the British Imperial system suggested a desire in London to reduce its global 
influence. As Buckner stated, "Responsible government was, after all, a device for 
retaining Imperial control over the colonies, a means of securing the collaboration of the 
colonial elites in the perpetuation of Imperial rule." Equally so, colonial officials were 
willing to accept limited restrictions upon their self-government because of other 
advantages to remaining within the Empire. In short, responsible government in Nova 
Scotia meant continued loyalty to the Empire with a restructuring of administrative 
re~ponsibilities.~ 
The traditional representative government that characterized the first British 
Empire began to loose favor as the colonies in British North America modernized into 
sophisticated nation-states.= The duties of the government quickly expanded beyond 
simple administrative tasks to include education, religious freedom, road construction, 
and law.6 With this modernization the elected assembly believed that since they 
Buckner, 7%e Transition to Responsible Government, p. 6. 
Buckner, The Transition lo Respovtsible Government, p. 18; J .  Murray Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia: 
Volume 1, 1710-1896 (Tantallon, NS: Four East Publications, 1985), p. 101. 
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represented the voice of the people, they should have more initiative in legislation.' 
Through patronage the executive councils of British North America controlled the 
majority of government activity. Governmental appointments in Nova Scotia were 
limited and therefore the council had much less power than those in the Canadas, where 
government patronage was much more extensive. Reformers such as Joseph Howe 
questioned the imperial appointment of council members who had no responsibility to 
the popularly-elected ~ s s e m b l ~ . '  
The colonial governors in Nova Scotia, as in all the British colonies in North 
America, initially opposed the growing influence of a reform-minded group within the 
political system. In 1833 the British Parliament offered to reduce its financial dealings 
within Nova Scotia by giving up quit-rents and casual and territorial revenues of the 
crown provided that the Assembly would compensate those who would loose their posts. 
However, the new colonial governor, Sir Colin Campbell, reported to the colonial ofice 
that the reform movements in Nova Scotia were the actions of a small, self-interested 
group that did not represent the majority of the population. This line of defense 
collapsed in the election of 1836 when the reformers took a majority of seats in the 
Assembly and consolidated their force into a working Reform Party. In 1838 Lord 
Glenely, the colonial secretary, ordered Sir Colin Campbell to appoint reformers to his 
council. Although he continued to resist, the reformers again won the election of 1840 
and Campbell was forced to c ~ n c e d e . ~  
' Buckner, m e  Transition to Repmible  Government, pp. 65,333. 
8 Beck, Politics of Now Scotia, p, 105. 
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Once the reformers gained complete control of the Council after the election of 
1849, they were able to transform the Executive Council into a cabinet of ministers 
collectively responsible to the Assembly for all the major decisions of the government 
and composed wholly of members of the party that controlled the Assembly. Thus, after 
1849 the locally elected body of politicians would control local government activities 
with little interference from London." This transition in local government in no way 
reflected the changing attitude in regard to the position that Nova Scotia should play 
within imperial commerce. Throughout the debates concerning responsible government, 
the colonial elites in Nova Scotia maintained their allegiance to mercantilism. Since 
there was no rebellion in Nova Scotia, as in the Canadas, the loyalty of the reformers 
never became an issue. Nova Scotia's fish merchants were dependent upon Britain's 
protected markets more than ever and the shft to free trade within the empire challenged 
their economic security. " 
The introduction of a free trade philosophy in the Western Hemisphere by no 
means marked the declining influence of the British Empire. Instead it ushered in a new 
phase of imperial dominance, one controlled by the economics of capitalism instead of 
the military might of an aristocracy. With industrialization gaining momentum and with 
complete control of maritime commerce, the leaders of Britain's government and 
economy became increasing comfortable with the economic theories of Adam Smith and 
lo Buckner, The Transition to Repnsible Government, p. 306. 
l1 Buckner, The Transition to Responsible Government, pp. 295-305. 
thus became believers in England's ability to control commerce under the guidance of 
the invisible hand." 
The loss of the American colonies after the American Revolution presented a new 
challenge to the architects of British policy. The old system of protective mercantilism 
would no longer benefit England with its chef source of raw materials and its primary 
market now falling outside of the empire. By incorporating the ideas of Adam Smith and 
free trade, the British government would be able to continue its domination over the 
American market. As one scholar notes, "Britain's success in retaining its economic hold 
on the United States suggested that the old system of commercial regulation was 
superfluous to an industrializing economy, where goods could presumably now gain 
access to any market on grounds of quality and cheapness a10ne."'~ England's leaders 
thus began to create an informal empire based on the economic dependence of other 
nations on English-finished goods.14 This informal empire depended upon the successful 
completion of Britain's industrialization. 
Industrialization introduced to the British empire the power of a new merchant 
class. With the advantages of capital accumulation, this class began to dominate the 
political structure of British commerce, and thus forced the empire to accept the policies 
of free trade.I5 This free trade would allow British merchants to control international 
l2 Andrew Porter, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume III - The Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1999), p. 1; Lawrence lames, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 169. 
l3  P.I. Marshall, "Britain Without America-A Second Empire?" in P.I. Mitchell, ed. The Oxford History of 
the British Empire. Volume II - The Eighteenth Century, (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1998), pp. 
576-577. 
l4 Marshall, "Britain Without America-A Second Empire?" pp. 585-587. 
IS Gerald Graham, A Concise History of the British Empire (London: Thames & Hudson, 1970), p. 156; P I .  
commerce by exporting quality English goods and importing a quantity of foreign raw 
materials. British imperial historian P.J. Cain states, "industrialization and population 
increase meant Britain could no longer remain self-sufficient ... Freer trade was necessary 
to encourage imports which would come largely from Europe and the United States and 
not the ~ m ~ i r e . " ' ~  
Imperial historian Martin Lynn has addressed the issues surrounding the 
development of Britain's informal empire at great length. His most recent article 
discusses how liberals in the British government encouraged the government to begin 
deconstructing its colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere. For many liberal 
thinkers in England, the colonies were expensive to maintain and had, historically, led 
the country into costly wars against foreign nations. The emergence of English industrial 
power made colonies unnecessary because England could simply control the market 
through the quality and quantity of her products, and not through military dominance." 
English maritime superiority played a crucial role in the establishment of an 
informal empire. Without the strength of the English navy and merchant fleet, English 
merchants could not guarantee the domination of "fiee markets." Lord Palmerston, who 
acted as the Foreign Secretary for most of the period from 1830-1 85 1, led the fight to 
secure English maritime superiority in the free global market. Martin Lynn has pointed 
out that through either economic or military means the superior navy and merchant fleet 
Cain, "Economics and Empire: The Metropolitan Context" in Andrew Porter, ed., The OxfrdHistory of 
the British Empire. Volume III - The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 32. 
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of England could successfully open markets to the country's influence, thus securing its 
domination. He noted, 
Given the favourable international situation and that Britain's industrial 
and financial lead was so great, opening an area to outside influence by 
treaty was often sufficient to ensure that British trade and finances, rather 
than any rival's, were paramount in that region. Opening economies to 
outside commerce by promoting free trade was de facto a policy of extending 
British infl~ence. '~ 
British North America and the North Atlantic fisheries were greatly affected by 
this change in British imperial philosophies. Nova Scotian fishing firms had depended 
upon the closed ports of the British West Indies for their fish products. The introduction 
of a free trade pllosophy in the Western Hemisphere resulted in the opening of the 
British West Indies to American products. Nova Scotian protests went unheard and the 
added competition from the Americans proved to be destructive to Nova Scotia7s fish 
merchants. 
The slave plantations in the British West Indies served as a principal market for 
the fish firms of British North America. Inferior quality products, such as mackerel and 
pickled haddock, which were unacceptable in the finer ports of the Mediterranean, were 
chief nutritional commodities for the West Indies' slave population. As the United States 
began to dominate the trade of the higher quality products of the North Atlantic 
following the American Revolution, Nova Scotia was essentially left with this trade to 
the West Indies plantation owners. When that began to dissolve in the 1820s, Nova 
18 Lynn, "British Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," p. 106. 
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Scotia's economic and political leaders began to attack the Empire's new found faith in 
global free trade.19 
It was not until the 1820s that Britain succeeded in opening the ports in the West 
Indies. Immediately following the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, British 
authorities sought to reestablish the protective mercantile system in the West Indies. 
After British authorities began to enforce the traditional Navigation Acts, English 
merchant ships controlled three-quarters of all tonnage involved in the West Indies- 
American trade routes, and the total number of American ships that legally entered the 
British West Indies dropped from well over one hundred in 18 14 to forty-four by 18 16, 
all of which entered due to special weather-related  circumstance^.^^ 
Under the leadership of John Quincy Adams, the American government began to 
seek an agreement with British representatives on the subject of Atlantic free trade.2' 
Although both American and English liberals shared similar philosophies concerning free 
trade, the details of the treaty delayed the signing until 1830. Few of these details are 
pertinent to this study, however it is important to understand the conflict that emerged 
between the British West Indies and British North America over the question of who 
would be allowed to supply the West Indies' plantation owners with their fish and fish 
products. 
For most of the period from the American Revolution to the free port acts of the 
early 1 820s, British North America continually failed to provide the West Indies with its 
l9 Lee F. Benns, The American Struggle For the British West Indies Carrying Trarie, 181 5-1 830 
(Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1923), pp. 2,29. 
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agricultural and marine needs. As a result, the colonies in the West Indies turned to the 
expanding United States to supplement their supplies.22 After the enforcement of 
England's navigation laws, the United States and the West Indies developed an indirect 
trade with one another. The Americans would ship supplies to islands under the control 
of other European nations which would then ship those same supplies to the British 
islands.23 Although the British plantation owners received the necessary goods, they 
were forced to pay an elevated price due to the complicated nature of this trade. During 
this period of American exclusion property value in the British West Indies dropped by 
sixty-five percent, and by the late 1820s a depression in the British West Indies 
developed.24 
Plantation owners and governmental leaders in the West Indies believed that this 
poverty was the result of an unjust system of mercantilism, and petitioned the authorities 
in England to dismantle the protective system of closed ports. The assembly of Jamaica 
became the most active body seeking what they called a "new system of introduction 
upon the mutual benefits" of all nations involved in foreign trade.2s Their objection to 
the mercantile system followed many of the same theories that liberals used in England 
to voice their support for free trade between the United States and the British Empire. 
The colonials in the British West Indies were certainly not alone in petitioning 
English authorities in London. Nova Scotia sent several petitions and letters to King 
* Armytage, i%e Free Port System in the British West Indies, A Study in Commercial Poliq, 117661822, p. 
130. 
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George IV and the members of Parliament pressing for the continuation of the protective 
markets upon which they so heavily depended. The economic and political leaders of 
Nova Scotia were quick to address the "great evils which would result to this Province, 
from the Ports in the West Indies being opened to the Vessels of the United 
Nova Scotians attacked the opening of the ports from every possible angle. Their 
continual belief in the benefits of traditional mercantilism became the basis of their 
objections. In letters to King George, the Assembly of Nova Scotia attacked plantation 
farmers in the West Indies for threatening the destruction of the mercantile system. One 
letter pointed out, 
some of your Majesty's Subjects are united with Foreigners, in endeavouring 
to change a system which Your Majesty's Government has pursued for 
some years, with so much advantage to all Your People who are interested 
in the permanent welfare and prosperity of Your Dominions in North America, 
and the West in die^.^^ 
Under this mercantile system, it was not just the Atlantic provinces that benefited, 
but all of the British holdings in North America. According to the politicians of Nova 
Scotia, the triangular trade of Atlantic fish, West Indies sugar, and British North 
American agriculture resulted in the benefits of a11 British subjects throughout the world. 
One petition succinctly stated: "Your Majesty's Loyal Subjects in North America have no 
desire to advance their local interests at the expense of those of the Empire in general, 
but humbly conceiving that in the present case, the general interest is identified with 
theirs."28 
26 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Proceedings," March 22, 1822. 
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In addition, the Nova Scotians suggested that the mercantile trade also benefited 
England's own industrial power by making the British subjects in the Western 
Hemisphere "better customers every year to the British ~anufacturers ."~~ If the United 
States grew to dominate the staple trade in the West Indies, politicians argued, they 
would surely also dominate the trade of goods throughout the Atlantic world, thus 
threatening the whole of the Empire. If London officials allowed the Americans into this 
market, "Great Britain would provide a Country, whlch appears destined to become her 
Rival, with the means of procuring Freight upon their several Voyages, and thus add to 
their commercial wealth and their maritime power at the expense of her own."30 
Nova Scotia's political leaders thus endeavored to preserve their "Commercial 
Privileges" that they beleived were equivalent to the privileges of their status as British 
subjects. The letters to London were accompanied by charts and data that tried to prove 
that the North American colonies had always been, and will always be, able to supply the 
British West Indies. Whde the West Indies claimed they where being deprived of basic 
necessity, the Nova Scotians attacked both the West Indies and the United States for 
falsely manufacturing these shortages. In a letter to King George the Assembly of Nova 
Scotia accused those in the West Indies of attempting to, 
comply Your Majesty's Government to abandon the wise regulations 
which excluded the People of that Country from participating in a Trade, 
which it has been always the policy of the Mother Country to reserve for 
British ~ubjects.~'  
Excellent Majesty," February 23, 1830, p. 597. 
29 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, The Journal of the Assembly, ' A  Message to the King's Most 
Excellent Majesty," February 23, 1830, p. 598. 
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This illustrates a growing sense of sectionalism in the British Empire as both the 
British West Indies and British North America attempted to strengthen their position in 
the imperial hierarchy. The West Indies claimed they had become a "sacrifice to the 
prosperity of the North American ~rovinces ."~~ The imperial government eventually 
agreed with these ideas and opened the British West Indies to American commerce in a 
series of acts from 1828- 1830. The resulting depression in British North American fish 
trade was directly linked to the loss of its last guaranteed marketplace, thereby opening 
the industry to the direct influence of the American fleet. 
In addition to the new markets for American products, the American market itself 
went through an extensive period of expansion throughout the nineteenth century. The 
economic historian, Stuart Bruchey, defines economic growth "as a sustained increase in 
real output per capita-an increase that results from rising inputs of the productive factors 
of land, labor, and capital, and of growth in the efficiency with which they are used."33 
Few American economic historians would argue that the United States did not experience 
sustained economic growth from 18 10 to 1860. Most American historians who focus on 
this period of economic development concentrate on the developments in ajpculture and 
western expansion. This expansion also had profound effects upon the North Atlantic 
fishing industry. First, the general population increase, and the specific growth in the 
urban population of the Northeast, created within the borders of the United States one of 
George the Fourth," April 4, 1822, p. 206. 
32 St. Christopher Gazette; and Caribbean Courier, as cited in the House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, The 
Journal of the Assembly, 'General Reports," April 5, 1822. 
33 Stuart Bruchey, Growth of the Modern American Economy (NY: Dodd Mead, 1975). p. xi. 
the world's largest markets for cheap food supplies, primarily fish. Second, the 
commercialization of American society and industry resulted in the concentration of 
capital and power in the Northeast, thereby giving the business leaders of the fishlng 
industry the capital to invest in the fishing industry and to influence the government in 
favor of their agenda. 
The urbanization of American society created a large working population that 
depended on other industries for food. From 1790 to 1860 the total population of the 
United States increased from just under 4 million to 31 mi~lion.'~ While a large portion 
of this population growth occurred due to the development of western agriculture, a 
significant percentage was the result of the developing urban communities. Cities that 
boasted a population of eight thousand or more rose from six in 1800 to forty-four in 
1840. In 1790 fewer than 2,500 people lived in the urban areas, constituting only five 
percent of the total population. This percentage rose to 10.8 percent in 1840 and to 19.8 
percent by 1860." 
Similar trends can be seen in the comparison between the apcultural and non- 
agricultural labor forces. In 1800 over 86 percent of the American population was 
engaged in agriculture, while the absolute agricultural population continued to rise - from 
five million to fifteen million - its percentage of the total fell to 63.4 percent in 1840. By 
1860 it had dropped to 53.2 percent.36 While total percentages of the agricultural labor 
declined, the service industry grew from 16 percent in 1810 to 28 percent in 1840 and the 
34 Bruchey, Growth of the Maiern American Economy, p. 63. 
'' Richard DUB&, Ac~~mufation &Power: A Economic History of the Unitedstates (Armonk, NY: ME 
Sharpe, 1989), p. 16. 
36 Bruchey, Growth of the Maiern American Economy, pp. 3,9, 12,46. 
manufacturing labor force tripled from 3 to 9 percent.37 The majority of the factory 
development occurred in the Northeast. In 1816 factories employed 5,000 workers, or 
approximately one percent of the region's employable labor. By 1840 the number had 
increased to 100,000. They now accounted for one-seventh of the region's labor force.38 
Urbanization in the Northeast, the development of western territories through the 
use of railways, and the development of municipal infrastructure and transportation 
improvement, all resulted in the concentration of America's capital and power into the 
hands of a minority of businessmen in the Northeast. They dominated the rail business; 
over sixty percent of the railroad additions took place in New York or New England. 
Between 1849 and 1858 the railroad business constituted an average of fifteen percent of 
the total gross investment, peaking in 1854 with 25 percent.39 
The New England fishing industries benefited a great deal from these economic 
developments. The increase in population provided them with a domestic market that 
was larger than that of any foreign market. American fishing firms no longer need to 
compete with international duties or tariffs. In addition, the United States Navigation 
Act of 1817 restricted coastal trade between American ports to American owned and 
manned vessels. The New England fish merchants now had a protected domestic 
marketplace with the expansion of a thriving American ports. In the years just after the 
American Revolution, the West Indies consumed sixty percent of the American-caught 
fish, but by the 1840s the United States used seventy-five percent of its own catch from 
37 M u f f ;  Accumulation & Power: A Economic History of the UnitedStates, pp. 14, 16. 
38 B~chey ,  Growth of the M d m  American Economy, p. 3 5 .  
39 DuBuff, Accumulation & Power: A Economic History of the United States, pp. 19-20. 
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the North ~tlantic.~'  Nova Scotian firms were all well aware of the wealth to be had in 
the American market but were unable to enter this market at the same advantages as the 
domestic fleet of the United states4' 
The concentration of capital in the northeastern states enabled the fishing firms to 
invest a large amount of capital into their business. This investment often came in the 
form of new ship designs that could meet the needs of the growing industry. The 
evolution of ship design has been extensively examined by maritime architectural 
historian Howard ~ h a ~ e l l e . ~ ~  By using his professional experience as a ship designer, 
Chapelle created hundreds of line drawings of virtually every fishing vessel launched in 
New England and Atlantic Canada between 1790 and 1935. Through his research, 
Chapelle shows the gradual increase in ship size from 1790 to 1814. During this period 
ships rose from an average of twenty-two to twenty-five tons, measuring thirty-six to 
thirty-eight feet on deck, to well over thirty tons and measuring over forty feet on deck.43 
This evolution pales in comparison with the dramatic developments that occurred 
in the Essex's shipbuilding industry after 1830. The expansion of the American fishing 
industry required larger vessels that could sail to the Gulf of Saint Lawrence or the Grand 
Banks off of Newfoundland, canying more fish to meet the growing demands in the 
United These larger ships, known as clipper pinkies, measured over forty-eight 
Roger F. Duncan, CmtaI Maine: A Maritime History (New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1992), 
pp. 410-413. 
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42 Howard I. Chapelle, The American Fishing Schooners, 1825-1935 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
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43 Chapelle, m e  American Fishing Schooners, pp. 24-26. 
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feet on deck and had holds of six to seven feet in depth.45 Ship size continue to rise with 
the introduction of "smacks" or "well-boats" that were designed to maintain the 
freshness of the fish. These vessels often measured well over fifty feet in length and were 
fitted with better equipment.46 
The introduction of ice into the trade after the 1830s brought about another phase 
in sailing fishing vessels design. The new sharpshooters, a schooner with a clipped bow 
very similar to the famous clipper ships, grew in length and carrying capacity. The 
overall length and hull depth - over sixty feet long and seven to eight feet deep - gave the 
vessels increased carrying space, while their sleek design - with an average width from 
seventeen to eighteen feet - made them stable and fast. Vessel construction increased in 
speed with the concentration of capital and supplies; in some cases a vessel could be 
completed within a month. Some shipyards could maintain this pace for over two years.47 
Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, fishing vessels continued to increase in size. The wider 
vessels of this later period, often over twenty feet in beam width, gave the ships the 
ability to carry larger canvas and stay at full sail even in rough weather  condition^.^^ 
As a result of extensive capital investment, vessel architecture in Massachusetts 
developed extensively in only a few short years. Contrary to this trend, Atlantic 
Canadian vessel construction fell well behind. Chapelle7s research has shown that Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Maine continued to use the smaller and 
45 Chapelle, The American Fishing Schooners, pp. 37-5 1 .  
46 Chapelle, The American Fishing Schooners, pp. 58-63, 74. 
47 Chapelle, The American Fishing Schooners, p. 78. 
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slower pinkies well into the 1850s .~~ The vast superiority of vessel design and outfitting 
in Massachusetts was remarked upon by many contemporary observers. A reliable 
source would be the Royal Navy officers who patrolled the fishing waters off the Atlantic 
provinces. These men were well versed in naval architecture and showed no bias 
towards local design and construction abilities. After spending several seasons on the 
fishing grounds these officers had close access to a wide variety of vessels by the 
continual boarding and inspection of those crafts. One such officer, Captain James 
Daley, observed the following: 
The American fishermen deserve a great deal of praise. Their vessels 
are of the very best description, beautifully rigged, and sail remarkably 
fast; well found in every particular, and carry large crews, a great many 
of whom are men from the provinces. The difference between the American 
and English vessels is very great, for all the English vessels in the Gulf of 
St. Lawrence the past fall, there were only four or five could in any way 
compete with the American. In fact I was surprised to see vessels of such 
an inferior description remain in the Gulf so late in the season; it is generally 
a very boisterous place in the months of October and November, usually so 
the past fall, and I am surprised that more fatal results have not been the 
consequence. I can scarcely convey to you a description of most of the 
English vessels; they are of the worst models, badly masted, poorly rigged, 
wretchedly found in sail and rigging, and about half manned.'' 
Improved ship design was the result of increased profits, but it also facilitated the 
further development of thls industry. It was thus both a cause and result of intensive 
capital investment and improved market orientation. The concentration of wealth in the 
Northeast also gave southern New England merchants increased power in governmental 
49 Chapelle, The American Fishing Schooners, pp. 27, 5 1 
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affairs. This power ensured that the federal government would continue to support the 
fisheries through the use of bounties on both fish and ships. 
The philosophy of free trade and limited governmental intervention that 
developed in the British Empire had dramatic effects on Nova Scotia's fishing industry. 
Not only did the Nova Scotians loose a protected market in the West Indies, but the lack 
of British governmental support from the Crown limited the investment potential of Nova 
Scotia's fishing fleet. The British administrators were not prepared to offer Nova Scotia 
or her fishing merchants bounties or bonds to encourage the industry. Similarly, 
following the theories of free trade to its logical conclusion, the British government 
refked to support a large naval fleet in order to protect the domestic waters of the British 
North American colonies. Between 1830 and 1854, the American fleet took advantage of 
this opening and thoroughly exploited Nova Scotia's inland waters and bays. 
Meanwhile, the American government set out an aggressive plan to encourage the 
expansion of the fishing industry. Along with several industries in the United States, 
such as agriculture, the fbr trade, and railroad construction, the New England fishing 
firms received handsome bounties based upon their total catch and the size of their 
vessel. In southern New England, business leaders took advantage of this bounty system 
and began to construct several large fishing vessels. The result was a concentration of 
capital and power into a few large corporation within the fishing industry. These 
corporations were able to invest large sums of money in the industry and further their 
domination of the fishing grounds at the expense of the more modest firms of northern 
New England and the Atlantic c~lonies.~'  
On July 4,1789, the first of several dozen acts by the American government 
passed which created a duty on the importation of salt and a bounty of the exportation of 
fish. Several acts followed, adjusting the amounts to be awarded and the requirements to 
be meet. The Tonnage Act of February 18,1792, replaced the bounty on exported fish 
with a bounty based on the tonnage of the vessel used. This act redirected the financial 
award fiom the hands of the exporter or merchant into the hands of the vessel owner or 
fishermen. These salt and fishing bounties were repealed on March 7, 1803, under the 
direction of then President Thomas Jefferson. With the outbreak of war, the duty on salt 
and the fishing bounties were reestablished on July 29, 1813. In order to assist in the 
paying of war debts the salt bounty stayed on the books as a result of the Bounty Act of 
February 9, 1816. The last major adjustment to the legislation was the Bounty Act of 
March 3, 1819. This legislation required that any vessel that received government 
subsidies maintain a threequarters American crew. After this legislative activity the 
fishmg bounties and the salt duty remained unchanged and unchallenged until the tariff 
debates of the late 1830s and 1840s .~~ 
These debates took place in the context of a larger controversy regarding the role 
of the national government in economic development. Those who supported the national 
govemment's active role in maritime commerce in order to preserve national trade - and 
5' Wayne O'Leary, Maine Sea Fisheries: The Rise and Fall of a Native Ztmdusby (Boston: Northeastern 
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therefore national power - often also supported the fishing bounties. Those who believed 
America's economic destiny was in agriculture and not foreign trade opposed national 
subsidies to any maritime industry including the fisheries. Not surprising, Northern 
politicians typically fell into the former camp, while Southern delegates favored the latter 
The opponents of the bounty directly linked this government grant to the duties 
imposed upon the importation of salt. In referring to the Act of July 8, 1792, the majority 
of the Committee on the Origins and Character of the Fishing Bounties and Allowances 
stated the following: 
This act is as explicit as human language can make it, in showing the 
allowances to the fishing vessels, as well as, the bounties to pickled fish 
and exported beef and port, to be founded upon the salt duty; rising with 
it as a matter of course, without any recommendation to that effect. Its 
limited duration to two years shows that encouragement to training of 
mariners was not even thought of. Two years would hardly supply a nation 
of  mariner^.'^ 
The majority of the committee continued to show that the fishing bounty was not 
related in any way to a desire to support the fishermen exclusively nor was it an attempt 
to raise a trained body of seamen for the naval defense of the nation. In examining the 
earlier attempts to repeal the duty on salt, and with it the bounties awarded to the fishing 
industry, the committee noted that the failure to repeal the legislation was not based on 
the encouragement of the fisheries but upon the fiscal needs of the government: 
53 For firther information on regional economic interests see Benjamin W. LaBaree, America rutd the Sea: A 
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the repeal (of the salt duty) was considered, purely and simply, as a question 
of revenue; not a word being discussed by whlch any human being dissented 
from the repeal on account of keeping up the fishing bounties and allowances, 
or took them into consideration of the question in any shape or way what~oever .~~ 
Therefore, as the salt duty declined, and would shortly be repealed, so should the fishing 
bounties be repealed. 
In addition, the opponents argued that the fish bounties and vessel allowances 
went against the nature of American industry, and that this legislation interfered with the 
self-promotion and individual will that was necessary for an industry to succeed in a 
capitalistic society that endorsed free enterprise. The legislation, opponents argued, 
resulted in "a depression of energy, induced by the protection of government." They 
maintained the following: 
if our fishermen desire to obtain control of the home market, they must do it 
by increased skill and by making a better use of all natural advantages than 
they ever made before-not by appeals to Congress for legislative aid ... l e t  the 
bounty be repealed; let these Fishermen be compelled to depend upon their 
own energies like other people, and their pursuit will be successful enough, 
and probably realize some of the advantages which they claim for it. But 
experience of every nation shows that the tendency of legislation protection 
is to depress individual exertion, and render unprofitable that which otherwise 
might be profitable ... The fnends of free trade can no longer in good faith 
sustain the bounty system.56 
The authors, however, made no such similar statement in regards to the land bounties 
offered to large railroad firms throughout the West. 
Other opponents of the fishing bounties attacked the system based upon 
accusations of fraud and misuse. J. Ross Browne, from the Department of the Treasury, 
55 Majority Report 26th Congress 1st Session, 1840, p. 25. 
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accused fishing boat captains from Eastport to New Bedford of dishonesty in their record 
keepings, whch were the basis for the government bonds: "It is well known to officers of 
the customs that but little importance is attached to an oath by this class of men ... such 
frauds are of frequent occurrence." Nor was ths  fraud limited to the captains or even the 
crew of the vessels. Browne continued, 
The shores are settled chiefly by fishermen; and the community is bound 
together by a common interest. It is alleged that during the season when 
halibut and other fresh fish are in demand, vessels, under cod fishery licenses, 
run in and dispose of their fish, or anchor about the shore and cany on mackerel 
fishng, without danger of discovery. The crews are usually interested in the 
results, or ignorant of the law; and the community, to whom such practices are 
familiar, consider it fair and proper to take advantage of the government, and 
dishonorable to become informers.57 
Supporters of the fishing bounties argued that the bounties and allowances were 
not strictly related to the duties on salt. Instead, John Davis, the author of the 
committee's Minorify Report, argued that it was more important to understand the spirit 
of the law and not just the letter of the law. The intent was to aid and encourage the 
development of the fisheries. That, Davis argued, was precisely why the fishing bounties 
had always been intended to be larger than the duties the fishermen paid on salt. The 
extra hnds assisted the fishing community in the purchasing of other necessary 
commodities, such as shipbuilding materials, that, in 1840 still required the payment of 
duties. To repeal the bounties simply based on the reduction of salt duties would thus 
violate the spirit of the legislation.58 
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In addition, the Minority Report drew reference to the Act of February 18, 1792, 
which based the bounty on the size and condition of the vessel used. As John Davis 
argued, this had no reference to the salt used and instead rewarded individuals for 
maintaining larger and more efficient vessels which could become useful in times of 
war.59 The fishing industry's ability to provide for the defense of the nation - in either 
the construction and maintenance of larger vessels or in the training of the next 
generation of seamen - played a major role in the defense of the fishing bounties. Davis 
used the Bounty Act of March 3, 1819, which required a majority American crew, to 
argue the point that authors of the legislation had intended the act to support a nursery of 
American seamen, and therefore should not be repealed simply based on a reduction of a 
salt 
Those supporting the bounty also noted the democratic nature of the legislation. 
According to their interpretation, by providing five-eighths of the bounty to the crew and 
only three-eights to the owners, the bounty was designed to support fishermen and not the 
owners or merchants who were most directly affected by the reduction of the salt duties. 
Davis claimed, 
This, obviously is designed to allure fishermen into the business, and to make 
them exert themselves in it, as the share of each depends on his own success; 
and this interest in the voyage is one of the greatest elements of prosperity in the 
fisheries. If the bounty was a drawback (for the salt duties) and nothing more, 
its amount would be ascertained and paid to the owners like other exporters; and 
would be allowed only on fish exported, or, at most, upon the salt used.61 
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Relying heavily on the democratic nature of the fishing bounty system, these 
supporters believed that the repeal of the bounties would have tremendous ill effects 
upon the equality of the fisheries and the success of free enterprise throughout the entire 
economy. John Williams of Kittery, Maine wrote: 
The bounty now paid is the sole means which many have to procure their 
outfits for the voyage; and that, if it be taken away, all such persons will have 
to abandon the business, which will thereby fall into fewer hands, and will, in 
fact, be monopolized by capitalists; the inevitable result of which will be a vast 
reduction in the quantity of fish taken, and a corresponding augmentation in 
the price, which will thereby dnve our fish from foreign markets, when they 
can now barely sustain a competition with the British exporters of the same.62 
Unlike other industries, the supporters of the fishing bounties argued, the fishery 
of the North Atlantic was such an unstable industry that only the wealthiest corporations 
in the business could sustain continual years of depressed results without the government 
bounties. Therefore the bounty was necessary to keep the industry democratic and open 
to those with large savings of capital. Congressmen John Anderson from Massachusetts 
would later argue that, "The profits from the business are so uncertain, both from the 
scarcity of the fish and low prices, that unless they had the bounty to rely upon, it would, 
as a business, be a b a n d ~ n e d . ' ~ ~  
Regionalism played a key role during these debates in the Senate. When Senator 
Thomas Benton of Missouri proposed a bill for the repeal of the salt duty and with it the 
repeal of the fishing bounties, Senator Robert Williams of Maine quickly responded. 
Williams was not opposed to the repeal of the salt duty; in fact he sought a complete 
62 Petition from John Williams and 87 Others from Kittery, February 14, 1839, as quoted in Select 
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renovation of the government's tariff policy and taxes on other articles that were, as he 
pointed out, "more oppressive and more unequal in its operation upon the different 
portions of the Union, than is the tax proposed to be repealed by this Senator 
Williams was, however, very concerned as to the reason why the salt duty should be 
examined independent of the other duties. It was Williams's opinion that the true 
motivation behind Senator Benton's proposal was not the fishing duty, but the repeal of 
the entire fishlng bounty system. 
Senator Williams drew upon Benton's obvious regional interest when he 
confronted the proposal, arguing that Benton had no real reason to request the repeal of 
the salt duty because, as a Westerner, he and his constituents received domestically 
manufactured salt at a reduced price. Benton's bill, claimed Williams, "provides simply 
for the repeal of the salt duty and fishing bounty, for the benefit of his constituents, and 
thereby taking from mine the only item in your whole legislation which goes, in any 
degree, to compensate my section of the country for the most grievous and unequal 
operation of the present tariff.'*' 
As a Maine representative, and a spokesmen for the entire North Atlantic fishing 
industry, Williams claimed to be representing the laborers and working poor of the East 
who did not have the luxuries of the wealthy West. Williams claimed that Benton7s 
voting record, which favored huge land grants to railroads, clearly placed Benton in favor 
of the rich corporate elite of American society. Williams stated: 
64 Speech o f  Hon. R. Williams o f  Maine, In Senate, 25th Congress, 3rd Session, January 29, 1839. The 
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But to test this objection by the acts of the honorable Senator, I would ask 
how he can contend that the bounty to fishing vessels is unconstitutional when 
he advocates and votes for bills to grant lands in aid of the construction of 
canals and railroads; to authorize States and incorporated companies to import 
railroad iron free of duty; and to authorize a drawback of duties upon such 
iron upon proof that it has been used in construction of railroads? Is there 
any principle upon which such gratuities to State and incorporated companies 
can be defended, which would not apply with more justice and propriety to the 
bounty to poor fishermen? The Senator surely will not be willing to be resented 
as advocating and voting gratuities to incorporated companies which he would 
deny poor individua~s.~~ 
Thus Williams presented himself as the representative of the humble fishermen. He 
characterized them as "a hardy, industrious, and adventurous population" who "resort to 
the grand banks which never stop payment" to provide food for the masses. 67 
By the late 1850s, large-scale merchants in Boston controlled the vast majority of 
the capital invested in the North Atlantic. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 ensured that 
foreign exports were routed to Boston. This perpetuated New England's control of the 
industry. These large-scale firms did not require the government bounty system and no 
longer actively lobbied for their continuation. By 1857 the salt duty and the fishing 
bounty came under re-evaluation and were finally repealed in 1866. By 1866 the bounty 
no longer received support from the politicians of southern New England. 
The bounty had its most dramatic effect on the newly emerged fishing firms by 
providing them with the badly needed initial capital. The bounty could thus be used to 
revamp an old vessel or as a down payment for a new and larger schooner. The larger 
firms had no real need for the bounty because they had the capital to sustain temporary 
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depressions in production. These large firms would just as soon see these bounties 
eliminated because the money would be divided among the crew and not be placed 
directly into the merchants account. Thus, as historian Wayne 07Leary has stated, "when 
the large fishing capitalist turned against the bounty, the last hope of retaining it 
disappeared. The hard reality for small entrepreneurs and working fishermen was that by 
1866 the fish merchants of Boston, Gloucester, Newburyport, and even Portland had a 
vested interest in not opposing repeal.'"' Thus industrial capitalism successfully captured 
the New England fishing industry by preventing the development of any small business 
competition. 
Fishing bounties and vessel tonnage allowances also played a role in the 
governmental debates in Nova Scotia. However, unlike the debates in the United States, 
those in favor of the bounties struggled to have them introduced for extended periods of 
time. The debates regarding the size, type, and method of allotting bounties to the 
fishing community cannot be viewed as isolated political discourse. Instead, these 
bounties were part of a larger constitutional debate between the elected assembly and the 
appointed executive council. The fishing bounties were only one aspect of a changing 
political system in Nova Scotia during the first decades of the nineteenth century. 
With the arrival of the New England Loyalists after the American Revolutionary 
War a new era in Nova Scotian politics began. Constitutional debate between the 
executive council and the elected assembly dominated political dialogue for much of the 
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nineteenth century. The road to responsible government began with these Loyalists, and 
the fishery's issues became mixed in with a host of seemingly unrelated issues including 
education, religion, and road construction. At the heart of these and other debates was 
the issue of h d  allotment and which branch of government would control the treasury: 
the appointed councilmen or the elected assembly.69 
Although the first general assembly formed in Nova Scotia in 1758 it did not 
wield much influence until it increased its representative body.70 The first massive 
migration from New England to Nova Scotia began with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
which closed the regions west of the Appalachian Mountain range to European 
~et t lement .~~ During the course of the American Revolution it has been estimated that 
30,000 Loyalists arrived in Nova Scotia, most of whom had left New ~ n g l a n d . ~ ~  With
their arrival a host of conflicts and affairs developed in Nova Scotia's political system. 
Along with the appointment of judges, the construction of colleges, and the control of 
money bills, the allotment of bounties for the fishing industry became a major debate 
between the traditional seat of power in the executive council and the growing size and 
influence of an elected assembly. 
Although the debates regarding the fishing bounties began in 1806-1 807, the 
profitable war years quieted the political unrest only to be reawakened with the post-war 
depression in 1 8 1 7 . ~ ~  The drop in trade with the British West Indies in 1820 heightened 
the demand for governmental support. Both the council and the assembly agreed that the 
69 Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia, pp. 19-67. 
70 Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia, p. 23. 
71 Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia, p. 29. 
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fishing industry needed assistance. The question was in what manner would the 
assistance be given. The assembly called for a bounty to be allotted directly to the 
fishermen upon landing, based on the size of their catch. The council, fearful of a poor 
quality of fish and the need to strengthen international competition, argued for a bounty 
to be awarded to merchants for the export of quality fish to profitable markets in the 
West Indies, South America, Europe, and the Mediterranean markets.74 Neither the 
council nor the assembly were willing to pass the other's proposals for fear of losing 
influence in the administration of the government and the control of the financing. In the 
end, no successful bounty would be awarded. The fishing bounties of Nova Scotia 
became a casualty of political debate. With the introduction of Responsible Government 
in 1848, the assembly gained control of the government and the bounty system was 
brought into effect." 
The Committee on the Subject of the Fisheries of the Province initiated much of 
the dialogue concerning the bounties that were designed to encourage the industry. In 
-1 821, Representative Graffe declared that the committee was "satisfied that this valuable 
branch of Trade requires some additional encouragement and protection."76 This 
protection was not intended for the fishermen but instead for the merchants who, due to 
the heavy duties on fishermen's salt, were losing their clients to the ports of New 
Brunswick where no such duty existed. As Graffe observed, the relatively inexpensive 
74 Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia, pp. 90,93. 
75 Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia, p. 13 1 .  
76 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, The Journal of the Assembly, "Report of the Committee on the 
Subject of the Fisheries of the Province," February 24, 1824, p. 106. 
provisions in New Brunswick "induced a large portion of the Fishermen in the Western 
part of this Province (Nova Scotia) to go to the Port of St. ~ o h n . " ~ ~  
In this way, similar to the American debate, the request for a fishing bounty had a 
direct relationship with the price of salt. In the opinion of the committee, such a bounty 
"would induce the Fishermen, in the Western part of the Province to procure their 
supplies from hence, and in return bring their Fish to the Port of Halifax, instead of 
shipping them to New ~runswick . "~~  This would not lessen the burdens on the 
fishermen, or otherwise improve their status, because they still had to purchase salt at the 
same price that they had been offered in New Brunswick. It would only redirect their 
purchases and other economic ties from merchants in New Brunswick to Nova Scotia. 
This policy, therefore, should not be interpreted as an aid to the fishermen, but as a 
supportive measure to the merchants of Nova Scotia. 
Although nothing came of these recommendations immediately, a bill narrowly 
passed on March 17,1823. It issued a bounty based on vessel tonnage and the 
exportation of marketable codfish from the province, provided it was camed in vessels of 
British ownership.79 Subsequently, on March 10, 1824, Brenton Haliburton and the 
committee recommended a bounty based on the use of salt. It passed by a slim majority 
House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, The Journal of the Assembly. "Report of the Committee on the 
Subject of the Fisheries of the Province," February 24, 1824, p. 107. 
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79 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Proceedings," March 17, 182, pp. 261 - 
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of fifteen to thirteen. These bounties were only designed to satisfy the immediate needs 
of the industry and therefore did not last 10ng.~ 
Within a year the bounty on vessel tonnage had lapsed and New Brunswick had 
authorized a similar bounty which, according the Lawrence Harthshore, had the "effect 
of inducing very many of our fisherrhen to resort thither for their supplies, and will 
withdraw fiom thls country a large portion of its staple exp~rt."~' While the 
recommendation presented by Harthshore was debated for some time, it failed on March 
8, 1826. This left the fishing industry with no governmental support.82 
A year later a similar vessel allowance was passed with the accompaniment of a 
one shilling bounty for every quintal of exported codfish to European and South 
American markets, provided they were carried from ports in Nova Scotia and aboard 
Nova Scotian vessels.83 The new committee chair, James Boyle Uniacke, who had 
recently converted to the reform movement, believed that although the design to increase 
the exportation of "Merchantable Fish" had "been fully realized," the restrictions as to 
the means and whereabouts of this exportation would, in the end, ruin any progress made 
in that industry. The restrictions were, therefore, in "direct opposition to the Spirit of the 
Law." The committee recommended opening this trade to ports otherwise not mentioned 
in the previous bill, and allowing the trade to be carried out by 
Vessels of all Nations and Markets, because, so far fiom giving to the 
Fisherman an extensive market and an increased demand for the Article of 
House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Joumal of the Assembly, Troceedings," March 10, 1824, p. 406. 
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hls Lndustry, it (the current bill) confines him within a narrow limit, to the 
enterprise of a few British Vessels engaged in a specific ~ r a d e . " ~ ~  
This action appears to be the first legislative attempt made by the House of Assembly to 
give more advantage to the fishermen rather than the merchants. Since few fishermen 
actually owned vessels large enough for foreign trade, the act allowed the fishermen to 
export their products in vessels of other nations or provinces. However, the Executive 
Council opposed the bill and it did not pass leaving the restrictions in place. Other 
attempts were made to encourage the fisheries through the use of bounties, but few were 
able to transcend the debates between the Assembly and the Council. Those that did 
were rather limited in nature.85 
The increase of American vessels along the shoreline of Nova Scotia after 1830 
further encouraged individuals to seek governmental aid for the fisheries. According to 
one petition, a bounty was necessary to compete with the Americans who caught 
mackerel on "the Coast of the Province and Gulf of St. Lawrence." Without 
governmental aid the merchants faced a "competition that the fisheries of Nova Scotia 
cannot withstand."86 Armed with such petitions, the committee requested a renewal of 
the bounties. It reasoned that a 
great benefit would result by inducing many of those engaged in the 
Coasting Trade to return to the occupation they have been trained to, and 
therefore recommend that a tonnage duty should be allowed on all vessels 
employed in the catching of Mackerel in deep water, thus offering competition 
84 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, ''Report of the Committee on the subject of 
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to the Americans in the fishery, and producing a force to aid in checking their 
lawless practices on our shores.87 
In addition to supporting the merchants and fishermen of this industry through 
financial encouragement, several members of the Assembly believed the govement was 
also responsible for supporting the industry by protecting domestic waters from illegal 
encroachment of foreign fishing vessels, principally those of the United States. Several 
petitions were sent to the House of Assembly in the 1830s in an attempt to make their 
political leaders aware that "great losses are annually sustained, in consequence of 
lawless persons resorting to the fishing stations."88 These "persons" were quickly 
identified as "American   is her men."^^ The petitioners called for an immediate response 
to the "unjustifiable interference of foreigners on Harbours belonging to His ~ a j e s t y . " ~ ~  
This practice, they pointed out, was in direct violation of the Convention of 18 18 which 
outlawed American vessels from engaging in commercial practices or fishing within 
three miles of the coastline of the province of Nova Scotia. 
Local inhabitants and investigators soon recognized that such encroachment 
depressed the annual catch of the domestic fishing industry. They believed that this 
"deprive[d] the Inhabitants of a legitimate source of wealth, and transfer to Foreign 
productions which exclusively belongs to this ~ o u n t r ~ . " ~ '  The petitioners recognized the 
" House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Jouml  of the Assembly, 'Xeport of the Committee of the Fisheries," 
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"serious loss and injuries suffered by British Subjects engaged in our Coast Fisheries by 
the constant encroachment of American  ish her men"^^ A few years later they would call 
for the "sending an armed Vessel, for the protection of the ~isher ies ."~~ 
More was at stake to these merchants than the mere loss of a local staple product. 
They also feared losing their control over the local marketplace. The initial side-effect of 
American encroachment was the development of an illegal trade between the local 
inhabitants of the Atlantic provinces and the American fleet. Nova Scotian fishermen 
would be able to trade their bait catch - typically herring - to American vessels in 
exchange for American finished goods, thereby breaking away from the control of the 
Nova Scotian merchants. 
in 1837, in an attempt to develop a working knowledge of the situation, the 
committee of the fisheries sent out several surveys to prominent merchants with twenty- 
two questions, most of which dealt with the recent anival of American vessels to their 
shores. These surveys provide an insight to the development of governmental policy 
from the distinct perspective of major Nova Scotian merchants. Judging from the return, 
it is clear that that these questions were sent to a specific group: the merchant class. No 
attempt seems to have been made to contact or otherwise consider the opinion of those 
who violated the laws of trade and commerce. All those questioned were those whose 
business was threatened by the growing trade with the Americans. In addition, the 
questions themselves suggest an anti-American stance. 
92 House of  Assembly o f  Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Petition of  Fishermen of  St. Margaret's 
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The focus of most of the merchants' responses pertained to the smuggling of 
American goods for Nova Scotian bait. As Gilbert Tucker stated, "The Americans catch 
bait, and purchase from the inhabitants on the Shores of the Province; the consequence 
is, they pursue their Fisheries more successfully in our waters, by getting plenty of fresh 
bait, without loss of time; the effects are injurious to our Fisheries, the Americans 
purchasing bait from the Inhabitants many times."94 Not only did the American fleet 
prosper from such an arrangement, by receiving fresh bait from locals without losing 
precious time having to catch it themselves, but Nova Scotia's fleet was hndered 
because the best local bait was saved for the American fleet.95 Philip Carten of 
Liverpool, Nova Scotia recounted many experiences where he witnessed American 
schooners arriving in harbors, "having onboard, Gin, Boots, and Shoes, Apples, Soap 
and other articles and opened a regular Trade with the Fishermen and sold the above 
Goods, taking in return Mackerel." Thus, "until the foreigners were supplied," Carten 
was unable to barter for the bait for h s  own voyages. From port to port throughout 
western Nova Scotia he received the same reply: he "could not get any Mackerel until the 
Americans were supplied, feeling indignant at the preference given to Foreigners told 
them they had no business there ... stated to the people that they were injuring themselves 
and robbing the Country of its living."96 
94 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "L,ette; from Gilbert Tucker, Montegan 
Clare, March 1 1 ,  1837," Appendix No. 75, 1837. 
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In exchange for this bait the American fleet provided the inhabitants with 
American goods. This practice was also recognized by a Royal Navy officer. One such 
officer, Captain Miline, stated that, "This illegal trade consists of provisions brought 
from the United States, in a greater quantity than is sufficient for their own consumption 
during the season, and therewith secretly carrying on an illicit trade in every port and 
r i ~ e r . ~  While the friendly relationship that developed between the American fishermen 
and the local inhabitants fulfilled their mutual needs, it also threatened the standing of 
the merchant class in Nova Scotia because their economy depended upon supplying the 
fishermen. They feared that their service would be usurped by the Americans. 'As one 
pointed out, "The American Fishermen occasionally bring quantities of Dry Goods and 
Groceries to the injury of our Commerce and ~ e v e n u e . " ~ ~  
The protection of the honest trader and the provincial revenues was of key 
concern to these  merchant^.^^ The development of this illicit trade threatened the 
"mutual confidence which always to exist between the Merchant and Fishermen of a 
Country, inducing the former to supply and the latter to make payments." In other words, 
the arrival of the American fleet threatened to destroy the debt-credit relationship that 
ensured the merchants' control over the local labor population. The developing system 
March 13, 1837," Appendix No. 75, 1837. 
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provided the fishermen another viable option to secure individual property and 
Thomas Small and other merchants were fearful of the "utter destruction" of their 
fisheries due to the encroachment of the American fleet, so they pushed for the 
development of a protective fleet to patrol the waters around the Atlantic provinces. lo' 
After continuous requests from Nova Scotia, the British government determined to 
supply to the province of Nova Scotia with the vessels for this protection and "to enforce 
a more strict observance of the provisions of the Treaty by American Citizens; and Her 
Majesty's Minister in Waslungton has been instructed to invite the friendly co-operation 
of the American Government for that purpose.'7102 The number of vessels operating out 
of Halifax fluctuated from year-to-year as funding and expenses were adjusted. 
However, the ships normally numbered between one and three and were seldom effective 
in catching the swift Gloucester schooners. 
The Report of the Committee of the Fisheries appeared in 184 1, released a full 
two years after the initial development of this protective fleet, stated that the limited 
number of vessels and insufficient funds provided to this policing force had made the 
whole endeavor a failure. The daunting coast lines of the Atlantic provinces, including 
thousands of bays, inlets, and harbors, made it impossible for only one or two vessels to 
cover the area. The committee pushed for added funds and the cooperation with the 
loo The nature of debt-credit economic relationships, also known as the "truck" system will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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authorities in New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island with little 
results. '03 
Six years later the committee members reported that they had been "impressed 
with the beneficial results that have arisen from the protection afforded to the Fisheries 
by the presence of the Revenue Cutters during the past year." They were also eager to 
recommend added support and continual funding in order to realize the full potential of 
their domestic fisheries.lo4 Although some success had been awarded to the fleet, the 
committee continued to push for the "employment of an additional armed vessel to aid 
the present Government better in protecting this valuable staple of our country."'05 The 
new protective fleet was extremely successful in checking the encroachment of the 
American fleet. Between 1839 and 185 1 twenty-seven American schooners were 
apprehended in the waters around Nova Scotia and confined to the Admiralty Court at 
Halifax. lo' 
By 1852, the British authorities in London began to push the American 
government to sign a free trade agreement that would include the colonies in British 
North America. In an attempt to persuade the American officials to set up discussions of 
the matter, the council in London began to strongly enforce the rules of the Convention 
of 18 18 that prevented American fishermen from operating within three miles of the 
'03 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Report of the Committee on the 
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coast. This enforcement included a number of Royal Navy warshps to patrol the waters. 
The sudden appearance of t h s  small fleet in 1852 flushed virtually all of the 
American fishing schooners from the inlets, bays, and harbors of Nova Scotia. British 
sailors boarded hundreds of them in search of violations, thereby leaving Nova Scotians 
free to prosper in a protected market. Many Royal Navy officers informed the Admiralty 
of their success. As one stated, "The protection this year afforded by the imperial and 
provincial governments has been, to a great extent, ruinous to the interest of those 
Americans who have visited our coast."107 
After the arrival of stronger imperial forces, few naval officers reported many 
violations. All of the reports from these officers stressed the success of their endeavor 
and that their mere presence had scattered the American fleet.Io8 The Nova Scotian 
fishng industry experienced some mild growth throughout the years of protection. For 
example, in 1839 Nova Scotia exported 19,127 barrels of pickled mackerel; in 1846 the 
colony shpped 82,645 barrels out of their ports.109 
In 1854 the Reciprocity Treaty introduced free trade in North America. Included 
in this treaty was a clause allowing American fishing schooners to freely enter the waters 
that were previously outlawed by the Convention of 181 8. The protection of domestic 
waters had come to an end in 1854 in British North America. With the opening of these 
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waters, American merchants were able to complete their domination of the North 
Atlantic fishing industry. During this period the Nova Scotian exports of fish products 
grew, but this export was dominated by American ships. Therefore, Nova Scotia's 
marine industry became a mere provider and little investment was made in the fishing 
fleet. Nova Scotians provided labor and commodity, while the real economic growth was 
resticted to New England fishing firms that provided capital and supplies and usurped 
the bulk of the region's wealth. 
Chapter 3 
Investment and Work in the North Atlantic Fishery: 
New England Firms and British North American Labor 
The North Atlantic fishing industries experienced dramatic economic transitions 
during the early nineteenth century. The shift to free trade in British imperial policy 
opened Nova Scotia's protected markets in the British West Indies to American 
influence. The growth in population and the development of urban centers in the 
northeastern region of the United States provided a new market for New England 
fishermen; in addition, the concentration of capital in the Northeast gave New England 
merchants the ability to reinvest large sums of money in the development of a more 
sophisticated fleet. Nova Scotian fish merchants struggled to convince their political 
representatives, in both the province and the empire, to financially support the fisheries 
with a bounty and allowance policy. Meanwhile, the American fish merchants had the 
advantage of traditional government aid that ensured the continual development and 
reinvestment potential that propelled their fleet far ahead of that of Nova Scotia. By the 
1830s the New England fishery industry had outpaced Nova Scotia's productive 
capabilities. 
The American industry leaders responded to the changing Atlantic market by 
expanding their production through technological development and the exploitation of 
new waters and markets in Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotian industry leaders responded to 
these shifts by calling upon their government to protect their interest through the isolation 
of their work force and commodity, secured markets, and an armed fleet. All of these 
were intended to preserve the traditional system of mercantilism and colonial preferential 
treatment. National policy and economic investment opportunities were not the only 
avenues affected by the transition in global commerce. These trends also affected the 
way people worked and how they were rewarded for their work in the North Atlantic 
fishing industry. 
Merchants used two very different methods to pay their laborers in the North 
Atlantic fisheries during the nineteenth century. The first was a system based on a debt- 
credit relationship that tied merchants and fishermen together, often referred to by 
historians and economists as either truck or clientage. The second was the use of 
currency or wage labor based on time or production. The latter relied on the existence of 
a large amount of cash and a substantial local labor force, and therefore could only be 
utilized by those industries that existed in a major metropole, such as Massachusetts. 
Conversely, the truck system was most successfully used in a peripheral society with 
limited capital and a small labor force, such as Nova Scotia. The arrival of an American 
fleet that practiced wage labor presented significant problems to the merchants of Nova 
Scotia because it threatened the economic bond between the employers and the workers, 
and therefore their socio-economic control over the labor force by presenting the 
fishermen with another viable option. For this reason the merchants of Nova Scotia 
continued to rely on the truck system in opposition to the introduction of American 
wages. 
The truck system had been utilized by virtually every participant in the North 
Atlantic fisheries at some point in time. When a resident fishery was first established in 
North America it had neither the capital nor the labor force to compete with migratory 
European-based firms. In addition the immediate presence of a large amount of cheap 
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land made it difficult for early American fish merchants to retain their labor force. In 
order to prevent a larger migration to the agrarian section these merchants needed to 
develop a system whereby their laborers would be tied to them in some way. In addition, 
they needed to reduce the risk of fishmg voyages and limit their capital investment in that 
industry because of the shortage of currency available in the colonies. The answer to 
these needs was the truck system.' 
Instead of extending capital to be invested in the industry, merchants extended 
credit to fishermen. The fishermen could use this credit to purchase the food and tools 
necessary for the voyage. This not only limited the amount of raw capital that each 
merchant needed for the industry, but it also answered the need of the fishermen who had 
no capital to invest. The fishermen was also guaranteed a continual supply of necessities 
throughout the winter. In return the fishermen would supply the merchant with their 
catch, which would be posted to the credit at an inflated rate. As a result, the merchant 
could be guaranteed that he would receive something for his investment and not fear that 
a competitor would take the product, thereby reducing the financial risk of the voyage. 
Finally, the fishermen would be tied to the merchant by debt. Annual catches would 
seldom be enough to repay a fisherman's total credit. This prevented most fishermen 
from migrating to another industry. Many historians, such as Daniel Vickers, consider 
this system to be the building blocks upon which the resident fisheries of the North 
Atlantic would develop. As Vickers argues: 
' Vickers, Fanners and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 86- 100. 
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The fishery succeeded in New England only because merchants and fisher- 
men were able to minimize the extraordinary risks of doing business in a 
frontier world. The vast geographic network of the fishing trade, the scarcity 
of capital and labor in the new colony, and the powerful competition from 
Newfoundland in the open markets of Europe and the West Indies created 
unusual problems, which in the first decade of settlement New England had 
failed to resolve. By combining in tighter relations of clientage during the 
1640s and 1650s, local New England merchants and immigrants West County 
fishermen managed to strike a productive if unequal compromise.2 
This form of labor discipline depended on the peripheral status of the region in 
which it operated. If there was a presence of capital, competition among fish merchants, 
or other options for employment, then the system would deconstruct. As Daniel Vickers 
has shown through his research, all of these factors would occur in New England by the 
later years of the eighteenth century. Thus the fishing industry abandoned this form of 
securing a captive labor force and replaced it with a wage incentive workforce. 
According to Vickers, 
as capital and labor accumulated in the colonial seaport, merchants discovered 
that they could recruit fishing hands without the expense of financing them on 
liberal credit terms; fishermen found that they could obtain provisioning without 
pledging their catch in advance; and the patron-client relations that had first 
organized the industry withered.' 
Industrial capitalism emerged in the New England fisheries. Vessel owners no longer 
sailed on the voyages; a gulf developed between workers and managers, and payment 
came in the form of currency rather than credit. These trends can be detected by 
examining the records of nineteenth-century New England fish merchants. 
Between 18 15 and 1829 Benjamin Knight recorded 130 separate entries in his 
account book for the fishing schooner Madison. Some important revelations can be 
Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, p. 
Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, p. 
made when a statistical analysis is made of these accounts. First, although Benjamin 
Knight's son, William Knight, received credit for voyages to the fishing banks, nowhere 
in the log does Benjamin Knight's own name appear as a participant of any voyage. This 
suggests that the owner of the schooner and manager of this firm did not go to sea, and 
thereby endorses the idea of a separation of the labor and managerial classes that was 
common in industrial ~r~anizat ions .~ 
An analysis of the records also suggest that those working for Knight's firm 
maintained a positive balance on their accounts. Among the 130 entries, the average pay 
per voyage was $103.87. Throughout the year the firm extended credit to a majority of 
fishermen who accrued on average $83.43 worth of debt in the course of one fishing 
season. This left on average $18.99 in cash to.be collected at the end of the season. At 
first glance, this might be seen as a debit-credit based relationship similar to that of a 
truck system. This, however, is a false assumption. A truck system works if, and only if, 
the company is able to keep the clients in debt year after year, thereby preventing them 
from moving to another firm or industry. Of the total accounts only eighteen, or 13.8% 
of the total, were left unbalanced. In addition, four accounts had negative balances that 
were paid in cash by the fishermen, at an average of $11.28. These figures mean that over 
83% of the accounts had positive balances; moreover, nearly 87% were balanced at the 
end of only one season. 
William and Benjamin Knight, Account Books, 1767-1 781. 1788-1833, 3 Vol s. Essex Institute, Salem, 
MA. Volume 3, pp. 130-240. Reel 6 of Daniel Vickers, ed., Primaty Sources iri the History ofthe North 
Atlantic Codfishery, 1658-1833 (Salem, Mass. : Essex Institute in Cooperation with the Maritime Archives, 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland, 1975). 
Therefore, only 18 of the 130 accounts were left dependent upon the firm, at least 
2 of which were identified as belonging to shoremen and not fishermen. In addition, the 
majority of these unbalanced accounts were in groups. This suggests that if three or more 
individuals from one cruise had unbalanced accounts than it was the result of a poor trip, 
and not a conscious intent by the merchant to leave these men indebted and therefore tied 
to the firm. 
In the traditional truck systems, fishermen and their families were also dependent 
upon the merchants for food and supplies. Out of the average debt of $83.43, 
approximately $26.69 of it was received in cash advances throughout the season. 
Typically these advances came in five, ten, or fifteen dollar increments. This indicates 
that the average fishermen only received $56.74 of merchandise on their credit. In fact, 
twenty-one fishermen had received more cash throughout the year than they did 
merchandise, and in the 1826-1 827 season alone, six of the twenty-one fishermen 
received no merchandise at all. These figures would suggest that neither the fishermen 
nor his family depended upon the firm for which he worked for their daily supplies. 
These accounts indicate that Benjamin Knight's firm did not operate on a truck 
system. The vast majority of fishermen had positive balances at the end of the season, 
and only a few carried any debt over to the following year. These fishermen were debt 
free and economically independent; thus they had the ability to seek other employment 
opportunities. In all, only eighteen fishermen appear in the ledger for more than one 
season; two were members of the Knight family. This indicates a certain amount of 
mobility among these fishermen. In the British colonies of Atlantic North 
America the workers exchanged this freedom of movement for a secure source of 
supplies and market for fish. 
Many historians, including Rosemary Ornmer and Sean Cadigan, have 
successfully shown that the fishing firms in Atlantic Canada still relied heavily on the 
debt-credit bond between the merchants and laborers. Similar to what Ommer has 
discovered on the Gasp6 Peninsula, Nova Scotian merchants used the truck system as a 
tool, "whereby merchant capital delegated the power of prod~ction."~ According to 
Gilbert Tucker, thls method restricted the region's development; 
our fishing Vessels are owned by poor men, they get their out-fits 
on credit, at the highest possible rate-their hands are generally hired, 
his own spirits are dulled from the knowledge of the disadvantageous 
circumstances under which he has to labour, his hands have the same 
feelings, in some measure, with the additional one, of the uncertainty 
of being paid, thence their want of energy and the unprofitableness of 
our fishing.6 
The truck system would only remain in operation as long as the labor force was 
tied to the managerial class through debt. The arrival of new competitors who offered 
the laborers better products and better prices threatened the merchants' control over their 
fishermen. Not surprisingly, many merchants, like those at the D&E Starr Company, 
wanted to stop this practice; 
Such a traffic deprived the Revenue of a large amount of Duty, the Province 
of a valuable export, and the Merchant, who has supplied those people with 
their out-fits, of his payment-the earnings of the Fishermen are squandered in 
useless traffic, his credit destroyed, and his time completely lost to the Country; 
whereas if a stop was put to their trade in our Harbours, a much greater source 
Rosemary Ommer, ed., Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective (Fredericton, 
NB: Acadiensis Press, 1990), p. 10. 
House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Letter from Gilbert Tucker, Montegan. 
Clare, March 1 1 ,  1837," Appendix No. 75, 1837. 
of valuable export would be brought to the Capital, and the credit and means 
of our Fishermen would annually increase7 
The American option soon became a very popular one. This illicit trade was not 
wholly excluded to fish bait caught in the harbors of Nova Scotia, but also included the 
agricultural products of Prince Edward Island, which became a favorite stop for many 
American fishermen during the season. This practice brought American finished goods 
into Prince Edward Island and other Atlantic provinces, thereby reducing the sales of 
English manufacturers. As Commander F. Egerton of HMS Basilisk reported, American 
suppliers soon became the preferred choice: "Their popularity with the people may 
perhaps in part arise from the introduction by them of contraband goods, or more 
legitimately of hard cash, of which there is a great scarcity on these shores.'" 
It was not long before the inhabitants of Nova Scotia turned thls illicit trade into a 
even more direct relationship. In a final blow to Nova Scotia's truck system, fishermen 
not only abandoned their credit but also their employment by seeking out better paying 
jobs aboard American vessels. Elisha Payson, a merchant and exporter from Bryer's 
Island, reported that the fishermen of his region repeatedly "go to the United States 
during the Fishing Season for employ because they can get more wages."9 
For many fishermen, the annual migration to the United States via a fishing 
schooner answered the needs for product, capital, and economic independence from local 
' House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Letter from D & E Starr & Co., H a l i i ,  
February 23, 1837," Appendix No. 75, 1837. 
ti House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, 'Report of Commander F. Egerton, of the 
HMS Basilisk," Appendix 2, 1854, p. 20. 
House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Letter from Elisha Payson, Bryer's Island, 
March 13, 1837," AppendixNo. 75, 1837. 
merchants, a benefit that merchantmen Paul Crowell recognized in his defense of the 
activities of the fishing class in his report of 1852: 
When arriving in the United States they generally procure good wages or 
should they ship on shares, their fish is taken to a market in the United States, 
free of duty or expense. As these vessels are generally bound to some port 
in Nova Scotia, those who are Nova Scotia men can take their little supplies 
for their families, and have them landed at their door, nearly as low as they can 
be purchased in the United states.'' 
By offering fishermen higher wages, payment based on cash and not credit, and a 
chance to enter the profitable American market duty free, many American schooner 
captains were able to recruit the local labor population of Nova Scotia. These fishermen 
served an essential role in the American industry; they brought with them the skills 
needed to perform the task and an extensive knowledge of the coast. Many oficials in 
the province recognized these important skills, including Lieutenant M.R. Perchell of the 
armed tender Alice Roger, who reported to his commander that the crews of the 
American schooners "are large, and part of whom are natives of this province, who are 
generally discharged before the vessel returns to the United States. The Americans prefer 
these men for their knowledge of the coast, and being better fishermen."" 
Many merchants of Nova Scotia saw this emigration as a severe threat to their 
own prosperity and the development of the colony. James Uniacke, a local merchant and 
the chair on the Committee of the Fisheries for most of the period under discussion, 
reported these fears in 1837: 
lo House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Letter fiom Paul Crowell to James B. 
Uniacke, February 10, 1852," Appendix 25, 1852, pp. 171-172. 
" House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Juurnaf ofthe Assembly, "Report of M.R. Perchell, HMS Alice 
Rogers, October 23, 1853," Appendix 2, 1854. p. 27. See also "Report of A.F. DeHorsey, HMSS 
Devmtation, October 23, 1 853 ." DeHorsey reported that "three-fourths, or at least one-half of the crews of 
vessels under American colors are our own countrymen." 
The Youth of the Province are daily quitting the Fishing Stations and 
seeking employment on boards United States Vessels, conducting them 
to the best Fishing Grounds, carrying on trade and traffic for their new 
employers with the Inhabitants, and injuring their Native Country by 
defrauding its Revenue diminishing the operative class, and leaving the aged 
and infirm to burthen the Community they have forsaken and deserted.I2 
Reports from Royal Navy officers offer, perhaps, a less biased opinion than those 
of the merchants, who were directly and negatively affected by this emigration of their 
labor force. One officer reported that the ''English and American Fishermen appear to be 
on very good terms and no disagreements of any kind came to my knowledge."'3 The 
services of the highly skilled Nova Scotian fishermen were as important to the success of 
the American fleet as they had been to the merchants of Halifax, as reported to the House 
of Assembly: 
The inhabitants of Pubnico chiefly consist of fishermen, many of whom embark 
in American fishing vessels, and, no doubt, as pilots, in many instances, for the 
fishing rounds around their neighbor coasts; and were it not for the better 
acquaintance with the pilotage, the Americans would be unable effectually, to 
carry on their employment, being a very intricate coast for navigation. The 
advantages offered to the Nova Scotians to embark in American Vessels, in the 
way of bounty, and of getting their shares of the fish into the American Market, 
clear of heavy duty, are very great; and numbers are constantly mixed up with 
their interests, and receiving their principal support from them ... At Barrington, 
a large number of American Vessels call on their round to eastward for the 
greater part of their crew. l4 
With this emigration of their skilled laborers, many Nova Scotian merchants were 
forced to seek out other employees. However, most of the newcomers were not as 
productive as the Nova Scotians. Many of these new men came fiom Europe or 
l2 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Report of the Committee of the Fisheries, 
April 10, 1837," by James Uniacke. Appendix 75, 1837. p. 4. 
l3 House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, "Report of M.R. Perchell, HMS Alice 
Rogers, October 23, 1853," Appendix 2, 1854, p. 27. 
l4 House of Assembly, Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, '"Report of Lt. W.W. Bridges, Armed tendor 
Bonito, October 20, 1853," Appendix 2, 1854, p. 29. 
Newfoundland; they too, however, would not become committed to the merchants. As 
Thomas Tobin reported, many eventually departed to the American fleet: 
Planters-in general the men that compose their crews are from Newfoundland 
an elsewhere-they, after serving a year or two, and realising (sic) a little 
money, proceed on to the United States, consequently two thirds of our 
crews are entirely strangers every year-as respect the Natives, as soon as 
they become of age they procure a Whaler and commence business on their 
own account. l 5  
While many merchants saw the flight of the fishermen as an act of treason and an 
abandonment of their native homes and domestic interests, others saw the problem with 
the system used by the merchants and government of Nova Scotia. These individuals 
attacked the government for not supporting the fishing industry. Some reformers, such as 
William Crichton, criticized the lack of support for the fishermen: 
So little encouragement is there given to our Fishermen, that they 
are even anxious to hire on board of American Vessels bound into the 
Gulf, and those being very often our best Fishermen ... our hired Fishermen, 
particularly if he is a young man ... concludes to proceed with the (American) 
Vessel, and a winter's residence in the States generally terminates in his 
becoming an American Citizen, and paves the way for others of his family 
and former companions to fol10w.'~ 
By the 1830s, the merchant control over the fishing labor through the use of the 
truck system had begun to collapse. The "fish hawks" of the United States had swept in 
and taken control of Nova Scotia's most productive industry. Nova Scotian merchants 
grew ever more fearful of their neighbor, a "Nation of Capitalists" that took every 
commercial advantage in exploiting the waters and laborers of Nova Scotia for their own 
l5 House o f  Assembly of  Nova Scotia, Journul of the Assembb, "Letter from Thomas Tobin, March 15, 
1837," Appendix 75, 1837. 
l6 House of  Assembly of  Nova Scotia, Journul of the Assembly. "Letter from William Crichton, March 20, 
1837," Appendix 75, 1837. 
advantages. l 7  Nova Scotian merchants continued to press the British for political and 
military protection. They argued that the authorities should not stand by, "for it cannot 
be desired that so many young men be should be employed on United States Vessels, and 
if they are, it cannot be supposed that their loyalty will not be shaken when they 
constantly hear republicanism loudly applied."'8 
The influences of American industrial capitalism were not easy to ignore. 
Following the 1830s, the North Atlantic fisheries entered a phase of rapid expansion. By 
incorporating new technologies such as the dory and the trawl line, the North Atlantic 
fleets began to bring in larger catches every year. Between 1804 and 1819 the custom 
oficials in Massachusetts inspected on average 20,923 barrels of mackerel per year. 
During the 1820s the average rose to 191,090; and by the 1830s the number had jumped 
to an average of 224,173 barrels of mackerel every season.Ig The North Atlantic fishing 
grounds were fast becoming crowded with both large schooners and open boats. This 
extensive exploitation brought both hostility and cooperation among the fishermen. 
Competition became increasingly fierce on the open waters of the North Atlantic. 
One of the many side effects of this increase in aggressiveness was a general depletion of 
stock and the increased pollution of the fishing grounds. Although the pollution of the 
waters from the discharge of the byproducts of the catch directly into the waters appeared 
to be an issue for the House of the Assembly as early as the late 1830s, it did not come to 
" House of  Assembly, Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly. "Letter from A D .  Gordon, Pictou, March 14, 
1837," Appendix 75, 1837 (italics in original text). 
18 House of Assembly of  Nova Swtia, Journaf of the Assembly. "Report of  Colin York Campbell, HMSS 
Devastation, November 10, 1852," Appendix 4, 1853, p. 1 1 5. 
19 US Department of  the Treasury, Report on the Principal Fisheries of the American Seas. By Lorenzo 
Sabine, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1853. Sen. Exec. Doc. 22. Vol. 6, Serial 662, p. 365. 
the forefront of the fisheries debate until Moses Henry Perley published his Report Upon 
the Fisheries of the Bay of Fundy in 185 1 .20 Serving as an immigration officer for New 
Bnmswick, Perley's responsibilities increased when he was hired by that provincial 
government to investigate the status of the fisheries. Both this report in 185 1, and one 
the following year, shed light upon the industry and the side effects of the exploitation. 
Local fishermen had the advantage of a nearby onshore cleaning station to 
prepare their fish for shipment and sale. The Convention of 18 18 prevented foreigners 
from landing their catch to be cleaned. Even if they were allowed to do so, it would cost 
the crew additional time and delay their return to market. Therefore, visitors to the 
fishing grounds, New Englanders in particular, were forced to clean and preserve their 
catch while at sea. The byproducts, or offal, of the fish were disposed of by simply 
casting the garbage overboard. The result was to pollute the bottoms and destroy the 
fishes' habitat. Although local residents tried to delegate specific areas for the cleaning 
of the fish, few Americans participated in this arrangement and it never had the intended 
effect." 
Some locals believed that the foreigners damaged their local waters and many 
called for the regulation of the disposal of the byproducts by an act of legislation.22 
Many local farmers and fishermen, especially in the border region of Passamaquoddy 
House of Assembly of Nova Scotia, Journal of the Assembly, 'Report of the Committee on the Subject of 
the Fisheries of the Province," Appendix No. 75, 1837. References to the pollution of the waters as a result 
of the throwing of offal overboard can be found in virtually every letter submitted to the report. M.H. 
Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Fundy. Laid Before the House of the Assembly by 
command of His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor, March 15, 185 1.  (Fredericton, NB: J. Simpson, 
Printer to the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, 185 1). 
2' MH. Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Funcrjl, I85 1, p. 20. 
M.H. Perley, Repor! Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Fundy. "Appendix No. 3: Letter From Cochran 
Craig, J.P., of Grand Harbour, Grand Manan, 10th December, 1850," p. 164. 
Bay, allowed American fishermen to land on their property to clean their catch and 
retrieve wood and water. In addition to preserving their local waters from the waste, they 
were also able to establish trade links with the foreigners and use the offal left by the 
Americans as fertilizer for their One independent farmer, fisherman, and 
merchant, Andrew Wilson of northern New Brunswick's Miscou Island, agreed with this 
policy. As Moses Perley reported, 
Mr. Wilson is clearly of opinion that it would be far better for the resident 
Fishermen if the American fishers were allowed to land on these shores, for 
the purpose of cleaning and curing their Fish, than to compel them, as at present, 
to clean their Fish on the Fishing Grounds, where the bones and offal seriously 
injure the Fisheries-he says, they should either be excluded altogether from the 
Gulf, or else allowed to land upon its shores.24 
Their by-products also damaged the nets and weirs of the local fishermen and 
hindered their ability to catch the inshore fish. The use of nets and weirs became a 
controversial tactic as productivity dropped. These nets increased the catch of small fish, 
such as herring, which in turn decreased the food available for larger fish such as cod and 
pollack. The disproportional catch of small and large fish resulted in a diminishment of 
the overall fish ecosystem. Those who fished for the large haddock and cod were hostile 
to the use of the nets and weirs because they interrupted the feeding cycle of their 
The general overproduction of the fisheries drew criticism. Many local residents 
were hostile to the policies of the large American schooners of discarding less profitable 
Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the B q  of Fundy, p. 10. 
24 M.H. Perley, Report on the Seas and River Fisheries of New Brunswick. Laid Before the House o f  the 
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25 Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the B q  of Funcfy, pp. 8, 41 -42. 
fish to make room for the more lucrative The overproduction of the fisheries 
was not limited to American schooners, and many local areas complained of all 
"foreigners," including citizens of their own province. Residents of Grand Manan 
complained to Perley about fishermen from Saint John, who brought in more vessels, 
men, and capital than the locals could muster. Perley registered their complaints to the 
House of Assembly: "The fishery, they said, was continually falling off, and would 
eventually be destroyed; from the reckless manner in which it was prosecuted, and the 
place being over-fi~hed.'"~ 
Fishermen began to recognize the importance of understanding the life cycle and 
ecosystem of the fish in the North Atlantic. They criticized those who fished beyond 
their capacity and those who fished during spawning season.28 River fishermen 
demanded fish wells to be inserted in all dams and even trapped and re-released river fish 
upstream, past the dams.29 Inshore fishers complained of water pollution caused by the 
industrial development of large cities such as Saint John. Mill run-off and saw dust were 
recognized as harmful to the fisheries, and the New Brunswick lumber industry received 
criticism from the fishing community for its practices. Perley recorded the following 
complaints by John Sandell in 185 1 : 
The fishermen of Saint John exclaim loudly, and not without cause, against 
mills, mill-dams, and other obstacles to the free passage of the fish up to 
their spawning beds ... they depreciate in unmeasured terms, the casting of 
saw dust and mill rubbish, into streams frequented by spawning fish, which 
is undoubtedly productive of serious injury to the fi~heries.~' 
26 Perley, Report on the Seas andRiver Fisheriesaf New Bnmswick, p. 22. 
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Although American fishing schooners were seen as contributing to the ecological damage 
done to the fisheries, they were not exclusively held responsible for the depletion of the 
stock. 
In addition to the practice of over-exploitation, both the American and the British 
inspectors sharply criticized the techruques used to prepare the fish for market. In both 
his 185 1 and 1852 reports, Moses Perley discussed the methods used by New 
Brunswickers to prepare fish for exportation.31 Although many of the local fishermen 
argued that the American markets, especially those in the slave states, willingly accepted 
the fish as they were, Perley believed that they would never be able to gain a foothold in 
the more lucrative markets of Europe and northern and western United States. In a 
meeting with the fishermen of Grand Manan, he stated the following: 
They were told that they could not expect to obtain remunerating prices, 
or find steady markets for fish so badly cured as scarcely to be fit for 
exportation, and whlch certainly would not be allowed to be exported if a 
proper system of inspection were established .... The fishermen were told, 
that besides Foreign markets which might be opened under a better system 
of cure and inspection, there was in Canada an extensive demand for well 
cured fish, as also in the Western States bordering on the Great ~ a k e s . ~ ~  
In addition to achieving new markets, Perley saw this practice as a waste of natural 
resources. As he observed, "At present, from the entire absence of both skill and cure, 
one of the most prolific and most valuable fisheries of the Gulf is rendered of the least 
value, and there is a complete waste of the bounties of ~rovidence."~~ 
31 Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Fundy, pp. 3-5, 18-19, 100, 171. M.H. Perley, Report on 
the Seas and Rwer Fisheries of New Brunswick, pp. 3 1, 1 1 1, 1 13. 
j2 Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Fmdy, pp. 18-19. 
j3 Perley, Report on the Seas and River Fisheries of New Brunswick, p. 1 1 1. 
Improving the curing technique was one facet of a general attempt to increase the 
productivity of the local fishery. Perley believed that this industry could be extremely 
profitable to the province and its residents: 
The fish of the Bay of Fundy when drawn from the water, are most excellent; 
they can scarcely be equaled and certainly not surpassed elsewhere. Yet these 
admirable fish, either from ignorance, neglect, or laziness or all combined, are 
so wretchedly cured, as only to be fit for the poorest markets.34 
The question that these critics and reformers struggled with was why the fisheries were 
so profitable for the Americans and not for the local residents. In his conclusion, Perley 
stated the following: "With such valuable and unlimited Fisheries in close proximity to 
these Colonies, and as it may be said at the very doors of the inhabitants, it is no less 
strange than true, that they are prosecuted to the greatest extent, and with the most profit 
by citizens of France, and of the United ~tates."~' 
For many, the solution to this problem was not just the improvement of 
preparation practices, but also an increase in capital investment. John Doran of 
Shippegan, New Brunswick observed in a letter to the Assembly that "a small business 
will not answer ... The sea around us is a mine of wealth, but from want of enterprise and 
capital we are just wasting our lifetime in useless drudgery."36 Another merchant, John 
E. Fairbanks of Woodside, Nova Scotia, agreed that the increase in capital investment 
would in turn bring into effect improved technology which would aid in the growth of the 
colony's industries. In a letter he stated, "I have often thought, that when men of capital 
and enterprise turn their attention to this branch of industry, as they no doubt will do 
34 Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Fundy, p. 100. 
35 Perley, Report on the Seas and River Fisheries of New Brunwick, p. 107. 
36 Perley, Report on the Seas and River Fisheries of New Bnmswick, "Appendix No. 4: Copy of Letter from 
John Doran, esquire, J.P., of Shippegan, respecting the Sea Fisheries," p. 94. 
hereafter, many improved modes of conducting it will be introduced." Unlike the 
fishermen, the merchants did not view the shortcomings of the industry as the results of 
natural limitations. Woodside continued: "the supply can never be exhausted;" instead 
the problem was in idle and unskilled workers who dld not bring in enough profit to 
make the fisheries worthy of additional capital invest~nent.~~ 
Americans were not immune to the up and down strokes of the industry. Lorenzo 
Sabine, an American inspector of the fisheries, sharply attacked the idea that the 
Americans had any advantages over the British in the fisheries and instead argued that 
any advantages were with the British who lived in close proximity to the richest waters: 
Of the fisheries, particularly, it is entirely true to say that they never have 
afforded, and never will afford, constant and continuous rewards, for, aside 
from the loses consequent upon overstock and glutted markets, the most 
unwearied industry and the highest degree of skill are often insufficient to 
insure good fares. Our colonial neighbors should take these matters into the 
account, and while lamenting their calamities, remember that the American 
fishermen, whose conditions they consider so much preferable to their own, 
are subject to the same reverses, and would gladly surrender many of the 
privileges they are supposed to enjoy, for the liberty of living near to, and of 
freely using, the inner or shore fishing-grounds, of which they are now deprived, 
and which are reserved exclusively for British subjects.38 
Sabine believed that the British colonists were letting the fisheries go to waste for 
want of energy and discipline, "The fisheries of New Brunswick are prosecuted with 
neither skill nor vigor," he pointed out, and their poverty was neither the result of market 
trends nor of American encroachment but from "their own want of industry, thrift, 
'' Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Funby, L'Appendix No. 6: Letter on the Deep Sea 
Fisheries from the Honorable John E. Fairbanks, of Halifax, Nova Scotia," pp. 17 1-172. 
'' US Department of the Treasury, Report on the Principal Fisheries of the American Seas. By Lorenzo 
Sabine, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1853. Sen. Exec. Doc. 22. Vol. 6, Serial 662, p. 231. 
cleanliness, and honesty."39 His attack was not limited to the small-scale fisheries of 
New Brunswick. Even the large fishing firms of Nova Scotia received harsh words of 
condemnation: 'No American visits Nova Scotia without being amazed at the apathy 
which prevails among the people, and without 'calculating' the advantages which they 
enjoy, but will not improve ... Yet the colonists look on and complain of us. They will 
neither fish themselves nor allow us to do so."40 
While Sabine's comments were harsh, and his negative portrayal of the colonial 
fishermen were clearly biased in favor of American interests, his conclusion regarding 
the colonial workers' lack of capital and industrious development mirrored that of the 
provinces' own policy makers and investigators. As has been shown through the writings 
of Moses Perley, petitions submitted to the House of Assembly, letter and surveys 
collected by investigators, and reports compiled by committees on the subject of the 
fisheries, the British North American fishermen and merchants of the North Atlantic did 
not invest the same amount of time, energy, and capital into their own domestic fleets. 
This want of active engagement was the result of the traditional system of a debt- 
credit relationship between manager and laborer. Although this system had the flexibility 
to preserve a mutual dependence between the classes in a peripheral society, its reliance 
upon traditional values and economic systems prevented it from expanding and 
competing with the industrial capitalist system that operated in the more profitable arena 
of southern New England. While sharply attacked by many historians, the nineteenth- 
century version of industrial capitalism provided the labor discipline and the desire for 
39 US Department of the Treasury, Report on the PrincipaI Fisheries of the American Seas, pp. 255,258. 
* US Department of the Treasury, Report on the PrincipaI Fisheries ofthe American Seas, p. 239. 
mass exploitation of natural resources that became necessary to successfully compete in 
the fishing indust~y.~' Overproduction led to a glutted market and falling prices, which in 
turn encouraged increased productivity to achieve a higher profit margin. Labor 
discipline became essential for economic success and severe punishments were handed 
out for "broken voyages."42 The result was added competition on the waters and 
extensive overproduction that led to extreme short-term profit making and long-term 
economic and ecological ruin. By the l85Os, the methods of ecological management had 
become a heated debate in the North Atlantic fishing industry. 
Local residents looked to the waters in their bays and on the outskirts of their 
ports as areas to be managed by themselves. In regions where depletion became an issue, 
local fishermen took it upon themselves to police the area, and refused to allow outside 
governmental officials to dictate the terms of use. The waters were considered to be the 
property of the public and not of any individual or government agency.43 This local 
control of the common property was not placed as an exclusionary measure for citizens 
of a foreign country. While political officials sought to exclude Americans and other 
foreigners from the local fisheries, local workers sought the protection of the resource 
from people they considered to be outsiders. Their own definition of "outsider" was not 
structured by political borders, but by social ties. 
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the cost of outfitting the vessel and crew. US Department of the Treasury, Report on the Principal 
Fisheries of the American Seas. By Lorenzo Sabine, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1853. Sen. Exec. Doc. 
22. Vol. 6, Serial 662, pp. 346-348. 
43 Bonnie J. McCay, & James Acheson, ed., The Question ofthe Commons: The Culture and Ecology of 
Communal Resources, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987), pp. xiiu, xiv, 3-34. 
In defense of their own resources the residents of Grand Manan, New Brunswick, 
sought to prevent the encroachment upon their waters by "outsiders" from Saint John. 
As Moses Perley stated, these residents "complained of the number of vessels which 
came upon the fishing ground, considering them as encroaching upon, and usurping a 
privilege which ought to belong to the settlers in that vicinity exclusively."44 These 
vessels did not come from New England's Gloucester or Portland, but from nearby Saint 
John. As British North American fishermen of Passamoquoddy Bay complained of the 
actions of their own countrymen, they eagerly sought a mutual cooperation with the 
American fishermen of the same bay. As Perley pointed out, "the fishing boats from 
Eastport, and other places w i t h  the limits of the United States, fish equally, and mingle 
freely, with the British boats on their fishing grounds, near West Isles, where the fish are 
most n~ rne rous . ' ~~  
The American inspector, Lorenzo Sabine, shared Moses Perley's views of the 
close cooperation between these fishermen. In his lengthy report he discussed how the 
fishermen of both counties conversed freely with one another and inquired about their 
women. During the hours at sea, separated by only a few yards, the fishermen discussed 
topics regarding from political trends to fishing techniques and market prices. The close 
cooperation was so pervasive that few Royal Navy officers were able to tell one from 
a n ~ t h e r . ~  
44 Perley, Report U p n  the Fisheries of the Bay of Fun&, p. 1 1 .  
45 Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Fundy, p, 28. 
US Department of the Treasury, Report on the Principal Fisheries of the American Seas, by Lorem 
Sabine, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1853, Sen. Exec. Doc. 22. Vol. 5, Serial 662, pp. 356-357. 
Trade was an essential part of this mutual dependency. Although such trade was 
deemed unlawfil by the politicians of Saint John, Halifax, and Washington, these 
fishermen, distant from political centers, determined their owntrading relationship at any 
given time. As a result, Moses Perley reported in 185 1 that "the people of Grand Manan 
enjoy perfect free trade" with the American markets in ~aine." British North American 
fishermen found capital and a market in the United States, and the American fishermen 
of Lubec and Eastport received additional fish to feed the growing American market. 
Perley reported that Eastport became the chief market for British fishermen in the 
borderlands region: "it must be borne in mind that the fish are chiefly caught by British 
fishermen, and carried over to Eastport, either quite fresh, or pickle-salted.'*8 
The American market offered for British North America fishermen an alternative 
to their domestic firms. The lack of merchant competition in New Brunswick, and 
elsewhere, created for the local fish buyers a virtually monopoly. As Perley reported, 
"the Cod, and other deep sea Fisheries, of the Gulf coast, are almost wholly in the hands 
of the Jersey merchants, who conduct their business very admirably, but solely with a 
view to their own profit, without regard to the interests of New Brunswick. They expend 
their earnings in Jersey, or elsewhere; they make no investments in the Province - and 
they do not aid in its advan~ement. '~~ 
American capital investors in the fisheries surely had similar interest as the Jersey 
merchants. They certainly were not interested in local development or equalitarian 
47 Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Funby, p. 21. 
48 Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Funby, p. 40. 
49 Perley, Report on the Seas and River Fisheries of New Brunswick, p. 83. 
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distribution of wealth, but Moses Perley and others believed that the added competition 
would stimulate development and assist the local population who "complained bitterly of 
their poverty, and state of bondage."% Perley described this truck-based bondage as an 
"absolute state of serfdom of the fishermen ... who are even in worse positions than 
southern slaves, and whose moral, physical, and spiritual wants, less care has been 
taken."" 
Education and training became additional motives for closer interaction amongst 
the American and British North American fishermen. Many inspectors fiom the Atlantic 
provinces believed that the fishing industry would never succeed unless the local laborers 
received proper training in fish production. Many of those who reported to Moses Perley 
stated that this training could be found in the American fleet. Perley observed that, "Mr. 
Harvey was very anxious that the Americans should be allowed to land on the coast, and 
prosecute the Fisheries, as they would teach the young men the latest and most approved 
modes of fishing, fiom ignorance of which they could not at present follow fishing 
profitably-and he desired that his wishes should be made known."52 Such educational 
need was not limited to techcal  training; it included basic and classical studies. In his 
closing remarks on the Grand Manan fisheries, Moses Perley stated that even with 
government aid, 
the greatest difficulty will be untouched-and this is, the low state of education 
in the Island. The Schools of Grand Manan are very inefficient; and the people 
are not sufficiently taught, even in the first rudiments of learning, to compete 
with their American neighbours, who are more acute and intelligent, simply from 
Perley, Report on the Seas and River Fisheries of New Brunswick, p. 25. 
'' Perley, Report on the Seas and River Fisheries of New Bnmswick, p. 26. 
" Perley, Report on the Seas and River Fisheries of Nav Bnmswick, p. 34. 
being better educated. The lack of learning is one of the greatest evils of Grand 
Manan; if the people there were better taught, and possessed greater knowledge 
of the world, they would readily perceive the numerous advantages of their 
position, and quickly avail themselves of the profits to be derived from it.53 
For Moses Perley, the benefits of American interaction with British fishermen extended 
well behind the waters of the North Atlantic. 
Conclusion 
British North American fishermen in the borderlands region had a unique 
understanding of the world around them. Merchants from Saint John and Halifax were 
considered to be outsiders, while American fishermen from Eastport and Lubec were 
local residents and friends of the family. The changing nature of manager-laborer 
relationships in the American fishing industry spilled over to challenge the traditional 
values of the mutual dependency of a debt-credit relationshp in the Atlantic provinces. 
The American market provided a more profitable return, cheaper products, secure 
employment, higher wages, advanced training, and government-sponsored bonds. For 
these reasons the fishermen of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia turned away from their 
domestic industry and sought an active relationshp with the American competitor. 
Fishermen challenged the political lines that had been drawn on the maps. American 
fishermen were not foreigners, but partners in a challenging working environment and 
allies in a growing international labor group. 
-- 
53 Perley, Report Upon the Fisheries of the Bay of Fundy, p. 22. 
The North Atlantic fishing industry constitutes an extensive socioeconomic unit. 
The vast majority of historical scholarship that discusses the nineteenth-century fishing 
industry approaches the subject from a local or national perspective. Most scholars 
neglect the Atlantic aspects of the industry. Although governments attempted to regulate 
where and when a fisherman could work, the fishermen of the North Atlantic often had 
their own opinions regarding local identity. As their behavior suggested, they were not 
restricted to their own domestic waters. Markets for their products extended throughout 
the Atlantic world. The transnational attributes of the industry not only produced harsh 
competition but also close cooperation between the fishermen and merchants of various 
nationalities. 
Although the Convention of 1818 limited the access that American fishermen 
traditionally enjoyed around the Atlantic colonies of British North America, it did permit 
fishing in certain inlets and land on unoccupied shores. These stipulations ensured that 
New England fishermen would continue their cooperation with the local population. As 
the need arose, New England fishermen quickly expanded their involvement outside the 
limits of international law. Smuggling goods, buying bait, fishing, and employing local 
workers in the fish trade represent some of the activities that superseded regional 
affiliations. While federal and provincial policies were often constructed in an attempt to 
limit or prevent this international cooperation among the fishing laborers, these 
legislative acts only fixther represent the global continuity of the industry. 
Studying the fishing trades of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries presents a 
number of methodological obstacles. Fishermen seldom wrote letters or journals. 
Fishing logs almost exclusively discuss wind and water currents, ocean depths, and 
87 
quantity of catch. Seldom, if ever, do they provide an insight to the social world of the 
fishermen. Fishermen's magazines and books mainly discuss gear and "fish-stories." 
Merchants' logs can provide extensive information on the economic makeup of a fishing 
community, but the scarcity of these sources could led to generalizations based on 
limited information. 
The largest cache of information for the nineteenth-century fishing industry falls 
into the category of government reports. Whlle many modem scholars may feel that 
political history does not truly inform us about a community and certainly limits our 
interpretation of the laborers of a given society, a revisionist reading of these sources may 
in fact shed a great deal of light upon a variety of subjects. Political leaders may not 
have acted in favor of the fishermen, but they certainly responded to the maritime 
laborers' behavior. The fact that merchants complained about the emigration of their 
fishing laborers supports the claim that fishermen were leaving Nova Scotia. However, 
instead of accepting the opinion of the merchants that ths exodus represented the 
disloyalty and the ignorance of the fishing class, historians can explore other possible 
causes, such as self-interest. When presented with a viable alternative to the debt-credit 
relationship between fishermen and merchants, the fishermen eagerly accepted those 
alternatives and thus challenged the economic control of the merchants. 
Likewise, American political debates concerning the fishng trade can be viewed 
in a new perspective. These interpretations can suggest other conclusions based upon the 
facts presented by political leaders. The challenges to a federal fishing bounty may have 
been presented in order to limit government investment in private industry, but the 
language of the defense supports the thesis that New England's fish trade fluctuated 
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based on international trends, and that the industry depended upon foreign markets and 
. sources of production. In thls way, evaluating the claims of the upper class within a 
borderland perspective can initiate new ideas regarding the international nature of the 
North Atlantic that do not come into sharp focus through regional and local assessments 
of historical sources. 
Citizenship stipulations in the American bounty system represented an attempt 
made by the government officials to deal with the growing problems in international 
competition. Closed markets and protective tariffs responded to an increase in imports. 
Nova Scotia's response to the British policy of free trade corresponds to the merchants' 
and politicians' real fears of American domination in the North Atlantic fishing trade. 
As a response to the globalization of commerce in the fishing industry, these policies 
argued for a closed protective market. Those in power in Nova Scotia sought to retain 
their control through protective markets and a protected labor force. When the workers 
themselves initiated closer cooperation with foreign competitors through trade, 
employment, and the acceptance of American capital and wage labor, they consciously 
challenged the debit-credit system that perpetuated their economic subordination. 
The challenge to traditional means of operation and the development of closer 
international ties can better be understood through the use of a borderlands methodology. 
The regional approach adopted by such historians as Rosemary Ommer, Daniel Vickers, 
and Sean Cadigan limits the interpretation of an emerging global economy. If one takes 
a view of the fishing industry with an eye on the larger dynamic of the global 
marketplace, the industry comes into sharp perspective and one is better able to 
understand the nature of investment and work within the fisheries. 
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The North Atlantic was a borderlands community, an arena in which economic 
transitions and policies greatly affected people on either side of the borders. Capital was 
invested beyond domestic grounds, goods were transported and traded between nations 
without the consent of the governments, laborers migrated outside their local community 
to find work, and national policies reflected an attempt to deal with the developing nature 
of free commerce and public resources. Grand Manan fishermen in New Brunswick 
welcomed their neighbors fiom Eastport, Maine; Halifax merchants competed with 
Boston firms in the West Indies markets; fishermen on Bryer's Island, Nova Scotia 
waited patiently for employment aboard Gloucester fishing schooners; and 
Newfoundland fishermen moved from Conception Bay to Essex County in search of 
better jobs. These activities are lost in regional histories. Mobility across political 
borders, both in work and in capital investment, was the cornerstone of the nineteenth- 
century North Atlantic fishing trade. Borders often had little meaning to those who toiled 
in the borderlands economy of the North Atlantic fishery. 
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